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I
INTRODUCTION
[I]t is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts
needs of handicapped children in order
to provide programs to meet the educational
1
to assure equal protection of the law.

Congress' desire to assure that traditionally disadvantaged children
receive equal educational opportunities has been a major theme running
throughout much of the federal education legislation adopted in the last
twenty years. 2 The theme is an elusive and complex one. Scholars considering the scope of the Constitution's equal protection guarantee have disagreed sharply and repeatedly regarding which of several possible
interpretations should be afforded the concept of "equal educational opportunity." 3

Looking beyond the constitutional arena, educators and philoso-
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1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1982). Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-142, § 3(b)(9), 89 Stat. 773, 774.
2. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1446, 1449-50 (discussing Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79
Stat. 27, designed to provide full opportunity for a high quality program of instruction in basic skills
so as to overcome effects of poverty and to provide a "basic floor" of services for all adults and
children in the United States); see generally Levin, Equal EducationalOpportunity for Special Pupil Populations and the Federal Role, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 159 (1983); Tolette, The Propriety of the Federal Role in
Expanding Equal Educational Opportunity, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV. 431 (1982).
3. Important early analyses of this question include Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Limits of ConstitutionalJurisprudenceUndefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 583 (1968); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1355 (1971); Yudof, Equal EducationalOpportunity and
the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973). More recent scholarship has continued to examine competing
definitions of constitutional equal protection. See, e.g., Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect:
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phers have recognized that the concept of equal opportunity is inherently a
protean one which may take different shapes depending not only upon the
context in which it is applied, but also upon which of a number of possible
4
objectives are sought to be achieved in a particular context.
Lawmakers seeking to embody the concept of equal educational opportunity in statutory form may hope, through legislative specificity, to avoid some
of the uncertainty of interpretation associated with the Constitution's terse
equal protection guarantee. The development of a detailed statutory scheme
necessitates a rather intricate statement of the equal educational opportunity
theme, however, and such intricacy may well compound rather than simplify
the problem of interpretation. Such a scheme may include numerous points
at which imprecise or ambiguous guidance is provided concerning which of
several subtly different conceptions of equal educational opportunity should
control. Problems of interpretation may also arise due to internal tensions
created when this highly nuanced concept is given different form in several of
a statute's myriad provisions.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA or the
Act) 5 illustrates the interpretive problems that have arisen when the already
elusive concept of equal educational opportunity is given more complex statutory form. Congress' concern with the limited educational opportunities
available to handicapped children spurred the enactment of this measure in
The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983); Levin, The Courts, Congress, and
Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. 187 (1979).
4. See, e.g., D. RAE, EQUALITIES (1981) (describing more than 108 distinct interpretations of
equality involving numerous variables including whether the subject of equality is individualregarding, segmental, or block-regarding; whether means-regarding or prospect-regarding equal
opportunity is involved; whether the equality is lot-regarding or person-regarding; and whether
equality is relative or absolute); A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS 143-59 (1967) (outlining
nine definitions of equal educational opportunity, including a "negative definition" (child's opportunity does not depend on parents' economic circumstances or location within state); "full opportunity" definition (schools must give child every conceivable assistance in developing his abilities);
"foundation" definition (schools provide satisfactory minimum educational offering in form of minimum outlay on each pupil); "minimum attainment" definition (schools must allocate adequate
resources to allow each student to reach a specified level of achievement); "leveling" definition
(schools allocate resources in inverse proportion to students' abilities); "competition" definition
(schools allocate resources in direct proportion to students' abilities); "equal dollars per pupil" definition (schools allocate same level of resources to each student); "maximum variance ratio" definition (schools allocate resources to pupils at a level which falls within a set percentage of deviation
from expenditures of other school districts); "classification" definition (schools provide students with
certain characteristics the same program of educational services which are provided to students with
corresponding characteristics elsewhere in the state)); Joseph, Some Ways of Thinking About Equality of
Opportunity, 33 WESTERN POL. Q 393 (1980) (distinguishing between equality of result and formal,
compensatory, competitive, and developmental types of equality of opportunity); Coleman, The Concept of Equality of EducationalOpportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC. REV. 7, 16-17 (1968), reprinted in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 9 (1969) (discussing types of inequality including inequality with respect to
community's tangible and intangible inputs into schools, with respect to racial composition of school
populations, with respect to consequences of schools for individuals with equal backgrounds and
abilities, with respect to consequences for those with unequal backgrounds and abilities, and with
respect to relative intensities of school and home influences).
5. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-01, 1405-06,
1411-20, 1453, 1232 (1982)).
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1975.6 It responded to a well-documented pattern of unequal opportunity,
which has resulted in the outright exclusion of handicapped children from
schools in many cases and their placement in poorly supported, ineffective
special classes in many others. 7 Congressional action was triggered by a
rising tide of constitutional litigation such as Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania8 and Mills v. Board of Education.9 Both
6. Congress had originally authorized federal financial assistance for special education in 1966.
Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat.
1191, 1204-08 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-230 § 622, 84 Stat. 188; current version in scattered
sections in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461) (adding new Title VI to Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27). Four years later, the Education of the Handicapped Act
was enacted. Pub. L. No. 91-230, Title VI, §§ 601-622, 84 Stat. 175-88 (1970) (codified in scattered
sections in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982)). Part B of that Act authorized grants to the states and
outlying areas to assist them in initiating, expanding, and improving programs for the education of
the handicapped. Id. at § 611(a); 84 Stat. 178, (amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 5, 89 Stat. 773,
776, current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1411). Amendments to the 1970 legislation were adopted in
1974, as a first step in modifying the federal funding formula subsequently revised by the EAHCA.
See Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat.
579-85 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982)). The 1974 amendments also contained the
seeds of several important substantive provisions now found in the EAHCA. See Comment, The Least
Restrictive Environment Section of the Educationfor All HandicappedChildren Act of 1975: A Legislative History
and An Analysis, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 717, 762-67 (1978).
The 1975 legislation was adopted following extensive hearings. See Educationfor All Handicapped
Children, 1975 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare on S. 6, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Educationfor All Handicapped Children, 1973-74, Parts 1-3;
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 6,
93rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-74); FinancialAssistance for Improved Educational Services for Handicapped Children: Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor
on H.R. 70, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
7. See generally Lazerson, The Origins of Special Education, in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES 15 (.
Chambers & W. Hartman eds. 1983); Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLAR L.
REV. 855, 868-83, 899-910 (1975).
8. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (earlier consent
decree). In PARC, mentally retarded residents of the Pennsylvania state institution at Pennhurst
alleged that they had been improperly denied any meaningful education. Since scientific evidence
had established that all children, including developmentally disabled children, have the capacity to
learn, plaintiffs asserted that no rational basis existed to justify the state's failure to provide suitable
educational opportunities, and that the state's action therefore violated the equal protection clause
of the federal constitution. Moreover, plaintiffs claimed that the state's exclusion of a vague category
of "uneducable" children from such opportunities, without the benefit of notice or a hearing, violated the due process clause. The state agreed to end proceedings pursuant to a negotiated consent
decree. In its order approving that decree, the three-judge federal court reserved its judgment on
the merits, but stated that plaintiffs had stated a "colorable constitutional claim." 343 F. Supp. at 288
n.19.
The PARC decision has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Haggerty &
Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961,
966-75 (1977); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: EmpiricalStudies and Procedural
Proposals, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 58-82 (1974): Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered The
Case of Special Education, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 63, 69-70.
9. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). Mills was brought on behalf of mentally, physically, and
emotionally disturbed children who had been excluded from educational opportunities in the District
of Columbia schools. Mills squarely held that exclusion of handicapped children from public education violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 875. Mills added to the PARC reasoning in two noteworthy
respects. First, the Mills court rejected the District's putative cost defense, holding that the problem
of insufficient funds faced by the school board could not be permitted to result in an outright denial
of educational opportunity to handicapped children, nor could the inadequacies of the school system
bear more heavily on the exceptional or handicapped child than on his nonhandicapped counter-
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cases had recognized that handicapped children were entitled to participate in
the nation's schools by receiving educational services appropriate to their special needs. The resulting legislation sought, to a significant extent, to incorporate this developing constitutional doctrine into federal law applicable
throughout the fifty states. 10 Congress went further, however, elaborating
upon the already intricate equal educational opportunity theme by introducing novel and important statutory variations."I
This article explores the equal educational opportunity theme as it is
embodied in the EAHCA's educational programming requirements. It will
focus on three key questions. First, it will consider the level and extent of
services which must be provided under the Act to address handicapped children's educational needs. Specifically, it will discuss the courts' efforts to
determine whether the mix of services to be afforded must guarantee a handicapped child only minimal educational opportunity, opportunity equivalent to
that provided his nonhandicapped peers, or some more optimal opportunity.
Second, the article will consider which of a handicapped child's many needs
must be met at public expense pursuant to the EAHCA. To this end, it will
examine the problems encountered when parents seek services which simultaneously address both a child's educational needs and his emotional and custodial needs, services which have traditionally been regarded as noneducational
in nature and thus beyond the range of schools' responsibilities to nonhandicapped children. Third, the article will explore the special problems which
parts. Id. at 876. Second, the court issued an extensive remedial order which foreshadowed many of
the substantive provisions included in the EAHCA. Among these were the requirements that all
handicapped children be served, that each child be provided an "appropriate" education suitable to
his individual needs, that children be placed in the most normal setting in which they could function
effectively, and that they and their parents be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing before
potentially adverse changes in placement were made. Id. at 878-83.
For more extensive discussion of the Mills decision, see generally those secondary sources which
address the PARC case, cited supra note 8.
For a further discussion by early proponents of handicapped children's constitutional right to
equal educational opportunity, see also Dimond, The ConstitutionalRight to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973); Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's
Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (1975); Herr, Retarded Children and the Law:
Enforcing the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972).
10. The legislative history of the EAHCA is replete with references to PARC and Mills. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430
(discussing PARC and Mills decisions); id. at 9, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1433
(stating that "over the past few years, parents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that
their children are being denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It should not
be necessary for parents throughout the country to continue utilizing the courts to assure themselves
a remedy."); H.R. REP. No. 322, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975) (discussing PARC, Mills and various
state court decisions).
11. For commentary which provides a useful summary of the Act's principal provisions, see generally L. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 25-48 (1984); Blakely,Judicialand
Legislative Attitudes Toward the Right to an Equal Educationfor the Handicapped, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 61533 (1979); Colley, The Educationfor All HandicappedChildren Act (EHA): A Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10
J. LAW & EDUC. 137 (1981); Krass, The Right to Public Educationfor HandicappedChildren: A Primerfor the
New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1063-77; Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of
Scarce Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477 (1982). For an excellent review of procedural problems raised in litigation under the Act, see Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of
Handicapped Children to an Appropriate Education: Procedures and Remedies, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1981).
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have arisen in determining whether noninstructional medical services, traditionally unavailable to nonhandicapped students, must be provided by school
systems as a result of this federal legislation. In particular, it will focus on the
recent debate regarding the availability of clean intermittent catheterization
and psychotherapy services, which some have urged should be regarded as
nondiagnostic, nonevaluative medical services that need not be provided
under the EAHCA.
The article will argue that these controversies can be more fully understood by examining the equal educational opportunity theme that unites
them. It will demonstrate that the courts which have been asked to address
each of the three questions just described have done so in ways that reflect
underlying uncertainty as to whether and how the concept of equal educational opportunity bears upon their resolution of various programming disputes. It will urge that recognizing the important role of equal educational
opportunity as a source of uncertainty, and identifying and evaluating the
competing interpretations of that concept that have emerged to date in the
three contexts of interest here, provides helpful insight into the substantive
requirements of the EAHCA.
Parts II and III will consider the level and extent of services required to be
provided under the EAHCA. Reserving the more specific questions discussed
in subsequent portions of this paper, part II will focus on pertinent legislative
history and upon early cases interpreting the Act's requirement that all handicapped children be afforded a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE).
Part III will examine the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Board of Education v. Rowley1 2 and conclude that the Court's interpretation of
the Act's FAPE requirement as guaranteeing a minimally equal level of educational opportunity to handicapped children is a legitimate and necessary
reading of the Act.
Part IV will discuss judicial efforts to delineate the scope or range of handicapped children's needs which must be addressed by the schools pursuant to
the EAHCA. It will suggest that novel questions are posed by the juxtaposition of this statutory scheme with the traditional approach to meeting the educational, but not noneducational, needs of nonhandicapped children in the
nation's schools. It will argue that the EAHCA supplants this traditional
scheme by embodying an inclusionary, rather than exclusionary, approach to
defining educational needs, that is, one that requires that services be provided
where needed for educational purposes, even if noneducational needs are at
the same time addressed. It will also suggest that courts should go farther
and abandon the classic dichotomy between educational and noneducational
needs, instead recognizing that all needs that directly or indirectly affect a
child's educational performance must be addressed pursuant to the EAHCA,
subject, of course, to the substantial limitations on the level and extent of
services, and the types of services required, described in parts II, III and V.
12.

458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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Part V will consider whether certain services, reasonably described as medical in nature, must be provided by school districts under the Act. It will
argue that textual references to medical services clearly limit districts' obligations in this regard, but that it is less certain whether the EAHCA's nonevaluative, nondiagnostic medical services exception is partial or complete. It will
urge that this provision can reasonably be interpreted as a partial exception
designed to limit schools' responsibilities in view of the particularly expansive
definitions of equal educational opportunity possibly or actually embodied
elsewhere in the Act. It will argue that this approach is consistent both with
the Supreme Court's determination, in Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro, 3 that clean intermittent catheterization is a related service, and with
the judgment of a number of lower courts that intensive psychological services, in the form of psychotherapy, may be required in certain cases.
II
LEVEL AND EXTENT OF SERVICES PRIOR TO ROWLEY

Disputes often arise between parents and school officials regarding the4
level and extent of educational services to be provided a particular child.'
Disagreement concerning the level and extent of educational programming is
most commonly voiced in practical terms: what pupil-teacher ratio must be
employed in a class for emotionally disturbed students;' 5 how many months
of instruction need be provided;' 6 must a teacher's aide be retained to accompany a handicapped child to mainstream classes;' 7 and what method of
instruction should be adopted for mentally retarded students' basic life-skills
instruction. 18
13. 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984).
14. See generally Kirst & Bertken, Due Process Hearings in Special Education: Some Early Findings From
California, in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES 136 (. Chambers & W. Hartman eds. 1983) (reporting
that in California administrative hearings studied, more than 22 percent of cases involved requests
for related services or an extended school year, while more than 70 percent of cases involved
demands for services allegedly available only through private day programs which traditionally have
provided more intensive services than those available through many public schools. Id. at 142-43.);
Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due Process?: Affecting the Outcome of Special Education Hearings in Pennsylvania,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 89.

15. See Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1386-87 (D.R.I. 1982), afd, 715 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983).
16. E.g., Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp.
583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remandedsub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 968 (1981); Yaris v. Special School Dist., 558 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Mo. 1983), af'd, 728 F.2d
1055 (8th Cir. 1984); Stacy G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61, 79-80 (S.D. Tex.
1982); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1981), afd, 716
F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984), afd as modified, 1984-85 Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR) (11th Cir. 1984) (on EAHCA grounds only); Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp.
1366 (E.D. Va. 1981); Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256, 1265-67 (E.D. Wis. 1980), affd,
658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981); Birmingham & Lamphere School Dists. v. Superintendent of Pub.
Instruction, 120 Mich. App. 465, 328 N.W.2d 59 (1982).
17.

See In re Brookfield Pub. Schools, 1982-83 EDUC.

HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:166

(Mass. SEA 1982).
18. See In re Marin County Office of Educ., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP.. (CRR) 504:162
(Cal. SEA 1982).
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These concrete problems mask a more deep-seated theoretical conflict,
however. Many school districts believe that their obligation to handicapped
children is a relatively limited one which requires them to provide such children with sufficient educational programming to allow the children to derive
"some benefit" from their educational experience. In those districts' view,
this is all they are obliged to provide to any student, all they can measure, and
all they can afford. In more theoretical terms, this "some benefit" standard
might well be characterized as a first derivative of the "minimum attainment"
definition of equal educational opportunity recognized by school finance theorists. 19 Under that definition, resources are to be allocated so that every student reaches a specified level of achievement. 20 In contrast, the "some
benefit" approach, of interest here, would assure students of receiving
resources needed to make some incremental progress toward their educational goals, without guaranteeing the means necessary to the actual achievement of those goals.
Parents have often espoused competing views. They tend to reject the
"some benefit" standard, which assures handicapped children a minimal
opportunity, in instances in which other children receive services designed to
facilitate their attaining a more than minimal level of achievement. Parents
have generally preferred either of two alternative approaches that reflect a
more broadly conceived interpretation of equal educational opportunity.
On the one hand, parents may urge that an "equivalent opportunity" be
provided their handicapped child. Thus, if a nonhandicapped child receives
programming that gives him a good chance to achieve appropriate educational goals, a handicapped child should likewise be entitled to a good education, taking his handicapping condition into account. In theoretical terms,
this "equivalent opportunity" standard perhaps most closely resembles
another vintage definition of equal educational opportunity proposed in the
aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education:2 1 the provision of equal tangible and
intangible educational inputs for all school children. 2 2 The "equivalent
opportunity" standard described here differs from this vintage definition in
certain respects, however. The "equivalent opportunity" standard entails
comparison of tangible services and facilities, such as pupil-teacher ratios,
rather than intangible factors, such as teacher morale. Such tangible factors
may, however, defy comparison in much the same way that intangibles do, in
view of the inherent differences in expenditures, facilities, design, and other
program characteristics that are associated with regular and special education
programs of equivalent quality. Moreover, a determination of "equivalent
opportunity" for present purposes seems to envision comparison not just
between programs for handicapped and nonhandicapped children generally,
but also between individual handicapped children and their handicapped or
19.
20.
21.
22.

The minimum attainment definition is discussed in A. WISE, supra note 4, at 151.
Id.
347 U.S. 483-(1954).
Coleman, supra note 4, at 17.
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nonhandicapped peers. The "equivalent opportunity" standard therefore
requires even more complex comparative analysis than would be contemplated under an application of the vintage standard to ensure equality of
opportunity between and among schools or school districts.
Alternatively, parents may argue that schools should provide a handicapped child with an "equalized" educational opportunity, by affording him
whatever services are needed to minimize the effects of his handicapping condition, thereby allowing him to benefit as nearly as possible from the same
educational opportunities that are available to his nonhandicapped peers.
This argument may be particularly appealing to parents of physically impaired
students who could be fully integrated into mainstream classes if adequate
means of translation were provided or physical barriers overcome. Viewed
from a more theoretical perspective, the "equalized educational opportunity"
standard represents a blend of two traditional definitions of equal educational
opportunity. It resembles the "leveling" definition of that concept, which
asserts that resources should be allocated in inverse proportion to students'
abilities, 23 for it contemplates that handicapped children would be provided
with whatever services are necessary to allow them to compete as nearly as
possible on an equal footing with their nonhandicapped peers. It also resembles the "full opportunity" definition of "equal educational opportunity,"
which assumes that all students will be given adequate resources to allow
them to develop their individual abilities to the limit. 24 Under the "equalized

educational opportunity" standard, however, full opportunity would be provided only to handicapped children, and only where, in the absence of full
opportunity, those children would be unable to profit from generally available

educational opportunities to the same extent as their nonhandicapped peers.
Congress and the courts, no less than schools and parents, have been troubled by such deep-seated conflicts, reflecting a fundamental uncertainty
regarding the interpretation of the concept of equal educational opportunity
as it applies to the level and extent of educational programming under the
Act. Section A of this part discusses pertinent portions of the EAHCA's statutory text and legislative history. Section B reviews early judicial decisions
regarding the level and extent of services required. The Supreme Court's
efforts to resolve this uncertainty are the subject of part III.
A.

Congressional Guidance

The EAHCA's substantive mandate is a deceptively simple one. In order
to qualify for categorical federal assistance, states and subsidiary local educational agencies must agree to ensure that handicapped children 25 within their
23. A. WISE, supra note 4, at 152-53.
24. Id. at 148-49.
25. "Handicapped children" protected by the Act include "mentally retarded, hard of hearing,
deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically
impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by
reason thereof require special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982). Regulations defining each of the listed handicaps appear at 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1984).
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jurisdictions receive a "free appropriate public education." 26 A "free appropriate public education" is, in turn, composed of two programmatic components: "special education" and "related services." 2 7 The free appropriate
public education required to be provided any individual child is determined
through an innovative consultation process. After a child has been identified
as handicapped, he is evaluated and a meeting of parents, teachers, other professionals, and perhaps the child himself is convened to develop the child's
own "individualized education program" (IEP). 28 The IEP includes a statement of the child's present levels of educational performance, his annual
goals and short-term instructional objectives, the educational services he is to
receive and the setting in which they are to be provided, the initiation date
and duration of those services, and the criteria and evaluation procedures to
be used in determining whether those instructional services are being
achieved. 2 9 Parents who object to a proposed IEP may invoke their due process rights to an administrative appeal.3 0 Either parents or school officials
3
may then pursue an additional appeal in state or federal court. '
For present purposes, the critical textual provisions are those which define
"special education" and "related services," for it is in these provisions that
Congress endeavored to establish the broad contours of the educational programming available under the Act. "Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the

unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction,
instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospi26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1982) ("In order to qualify for assistance under this part ... a
State shall demonstrate . . . that . . .(1) [it] has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to free appropriate public education, (2) [it has developed a plan to assure that] (B) a
free appropriate public education will be available for all handicapped children between the ages of 3
and 18 within the State ..
");id. § 1414(a) ("A local educational agency . . . which desires to
receive payments . . . for any fiscal year shall submit an application . . . [which] shall . . .(1)(C)
establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children, including
(ii) the provision of, and the establishment of priorities for providing, a free appropriate public
education .... ").
27. See id. § 1401(18) (defining "free appropriate public education" as "special education and
related services which (A) have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of
this title").
28. See id. § 1401(19).
29. For a detailed discussion of specific problems likely to arise in the development of a child's
IEP, see 34 C.F.R. § 300 App. C (1984) (notice of interpretation of federal regulations governing
development of IEP's); Id. §§ 300.341-.349.
30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1982) (describing procedural safeguards, including right of parents
or a guardian to examine relevant records, to obtain independent educational evaluation, to receive
written prior notice of proposed changes in evaluation, programming, or placement, and to file complaint triggering impartial administrative hearing by state educational agency); 34 C.F.R. § 300.500.514 (1984) (governing due process rights).
31. See id. § 1415(e)(2) (describing right of party aggrieved by findings and decision of impartial
hearing officer to bring civil action in state court of competent jurisdiction or in federal district court,
and requiring court to "receive the records of the administrative proceedings, [to] hear additional
evidence at the request of a party and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, [to]
grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate").
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tals and institutions."-32 "Related services," in turn, include "such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services . . .as may be required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education . . . .33

This statutory language is, unfortunately, ambiguous. Although the definition of "special education" indicates that instruction is required "to meet
the unique needs" of each handicapped child, it does not clearly specify
whether "meeting" such needs entails merely addressing those needs, fully
satisfying those needs, or something in between. Similarly, the key term
"benefit," included in the "related services" definition, is susceptible to several interpretations. The benefit provided might take the form of minimal,
incremental progress toward the child's educational objectives, progress
toward those objectives to the same extent as the child's nonhandicapped
peers, or enjoyment of the maximum benefits conceivable. Thus, the statutory language is arguably amenable to any of the three interpretations of
equal educational opportunity-some benefit, equivalent benefit, or equalized
Other statutory provisions provide little addibenefit-introduced above. 34
35
point.
this
tional insight on
The statute's legislative history is no more enlightening. Committee
reports discussing the FAPE requirement and pertinent definitions do little
more than restate the statutory text. 3 6 General statements of a desire to
ensure that handicapped children receive "equal educational opportunities"
32. Id. § 1401(16).
33. Id. § 1401(17).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
35. The EAHCA also contains several references to Congress' desire that handicapped children
be provided with "full equality of educational opportunity" or "full educational opportunity." See 20
U.S.C. § 1400(b)(3) (1982) ("Congress finds that... more than half of the handicapped children in
the United States do not receive appropriate educational services which would enable them to have
full equality of opportunity"); id.§ 1412(2)(A)(i) (State eligibility conditioned upon development of
plan with policies and procedures which the State will undertake to assure that there is established "a
goal of providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children"); id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)
(local educational agency desiring to receive funds under EAHCA must submit application to state
educational agency which "establish[es] a goal of providing full educational opportunites to all handicapped children").
Arguably, this language suggests that Congress intended to require that the needs of handicapped children must be met as fully as possible, that is, that they be afforded an "equalized" educational opportunity. As this article demonstrates, however, the concept of equal educational
opportunity bears on a number of aspects of the statutory scheme, and a similar interpretation of this
concept need not have been intended in each of these differing contexts. Federal regulators appear
to have recognized as much, for they carefully distinguished the terms "free appropriate public education" and "full educational opportunity goal" in commentary to 1977 EAHCA regulations. In their
view the phrase "full educational opportunity goal" is broader in scope than "FAPE" because it
covers children aged birth through 21, includes a planning as well as programming function, allows
local educational agencies to set their own timetables for meeting that goal, and calls for the provision of additional facilities, personnel, and services to further enrich a handicapped child's educational opportunity beyond that mandated under the FAPE requirement. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,506 (1977).
The inclusion of references to "full educational opportunity" elsewhere in the statute is thus of limited assistance in interpreting the critical FAPE standard and related definitions.
36. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1434; H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975); S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29-30 (1975).
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are scattered throughout reports, hearings, and floor debates.3 7 More specific
comments hint at a wide range of underlying views. For example, some proponents suggested that the legislation was designed to require school systems
to provide equal educational opportunities which conformed to constitutional
mandates. 38

Others

desired that "equivalent"

39

or "full"

40

educational

opportunities be afforded. In sum, Congress provided only limited guidance
concerning the level and extent of services to be required, merely suggesting,
in a general way, that some sort of equality-based standard might reasonably
be employed.
B.

Early Judicial Response

Faced with limited legislative and administrative 4 ' guidance, the courts
were initially left to their own devices to clarify the substantive standard to be
used in assessing the sufficiency of educational programming under the
EAHCA. Perhaps not surprisingly, early court decisions in many instances
gave lip service to some sort of equality-based standard, but split sharply over
the precise type of equality they believed the statute guaranteed.
The greatest number of cases spoke generally of Congress' desire to
ensure "equal educational opportunity," but adopted a restrictive "some benefit" test in order to determine whether an "appropriate" education had been
provided. 4 2 The test was variously stated and variously applied. At times, the
courts spoke of the existence or absence of regression or other harm. 43 In
some instances, this standard seems to have been applied because evidence of
37. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1433; 121 CONG. REC. 19,483 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); id. at 19,504 (Sen.
Humphrey); id. at 19,505 (Sen. Beall); id. at 23,704 (Rep. Brademas); id. at 25,540 (Rep. Grassley); id.
at 37,030-31 (Rep. Mink); id. at 37,412 (Sen. Taft); id. at 37,413 (Sen. Williams); id. at 37,418-19
(Sen. Cranston); id. at 37,419-20 (Sen. Beall); Educationfor All HandicappedChildren 1973-74 Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 6, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973), part 1, at 31 (Sen. Williams).
38. 121 CONG. REC. 37,413 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also supra note 10 (discussing
portions of the legislative history that reflect a desire to embody constitutional principles of early
cases into statutory form).
39. 121 CONG. REC. 19,483 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
40. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 19,482-83 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); id. at 23,703-05
(Rep. Brademas); id. at 25,538 (Rep. Cornell); id. at 37,025 (Rep. Perkins); H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975); see also id. at 13 (handicapped child requires tailored educational plan to
achieve his "maximum potential").
41. Applicable EAHCA regulations focus significantly on the types of services to be provided
pursuant to the Act. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1984) ("related services" definition); id. at § 300.14
("special education" definition); id. at §§ 300.305-307 (availability of programs and services such as
art, music, vocational education, athletics, health services, and physical education). The regulations
do not elaborate upon the level and extent of services to be provided, however.
42. See Age v. Bullitt County Pub. Schools, 673 F.2d 1,41, 144 (6th Cir. 1982); Colin K. v.
Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1387 (D.R.I. 1982), aft-d, 715 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Bales v. Clarke, 523
F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981); Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (E.D. Wis.
1980), afd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
43. See, e.g., Age v. Bullitt County Pub. Schools, 673 F.2d 141, 144 (6th Cir. 1982) (undue interference with development of skills); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1387 (D.R.I. 1982)
(stagnation or regression), aff'd, 715 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1370
(E.D. Va. 1981) (extraordinary or irretrievable regression); Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp.
1256, 1266 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (irreparable loss of progress), aff~d, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
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harmful programming presented such strong proof of a statutory violation
that it was unnecessary to consider whether some more stringent standard
might otherwise apply. 44 In other cases, however, it was apparent that the
courts regarded the absence of harm, coupled with programming which
allowed the child to make some educational gain, as sufficient to satisfy the
Act's requirements. 45 At times, the courts articulated the test in slightly different terms, asking whether the programming had afforded the child an
46
opportunity to make "some progress" toward his educational objectives.
Surprisingly, in view of the apparent laxity of the "some benefit" standard, a
significant number of cases determined that the challenged programming
47
failed to comply with the statutory requirement.
In a second class of cases, courts at least gave lipservice to a modified
"equivalence of opportunity" standard. 4 8 However, no reported decision
appears to have attempted to apply such a test in a literal fashion by comparing the objectives of nonhandicapped students against the services provided, and contrasting that shortfall with the corresponding shortfall in
opportunity afforded handicapped students in order to determine the relative
quality of the respective educational programs. 4 9 However, two alternative
approaches to determining "equivalence" were used, in each case without
explicitly acknowledging the logic underlying the courts' analysis. First, some
courts relied upon evidence in the Act's legislative history to conclude that
handicapped students should generally be guaranteed an opportunity to gain
44. See, e.g., Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1387 (D.R.I. 1982), afd, 715 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1983).
45. See, e.g., Age v. Bullitt County Pub. Schools, 673 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1982).
46. See, e.g., Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 759, 767 (D. Mass. 1981)
(failure to achieve significant growth, lower than expected skill development); Gladys J. v. Pearland
Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 877-78 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F.
Supp. 1256, 1266 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
47. Parents succeeded in demanding more extensive programming in several cases. See Colin K.
v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375 (D.R.I. 1982), afd, 715 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Norris v. Massachusetts
Dep't of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 759 (D. Mass. 1981); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F.
Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 658
F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981). However, the school systems in large part prevailed in others. See Age v.
Bullitt County Pub. Schools, 673 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1982); Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 539 F.
Supp. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1981), affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 720 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379 (1984); Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981).
48. See, e.g., Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 458
U.S. 1118 (1982), aff'don rehearing, 693 F.2d 41, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983); Gladys J. v.
Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Hines v. Pitt County Bd. of
Educ., 497 F. Supp. 403, 406 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (quoting Rowley); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F.
Supp. 528, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). This
position was also espoused by an influential student law review note which had taken the position
that the EAHCA guaranteed handicapped children equal opportunity for individual development
that is defined in relationship to the level of opportunity accorded nonhandicapped children in light
of services provided to the general student population within a given district. See Note, Enforcing the
Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Educationfor All HandicappedChildren Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1103, 1125-27 (1979).
49. The district court in Rowley purported to do so, but as explained more fully in section C,
instead adopted a more comprehensive equalized opportunity standard. See infra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text.
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skills needed to assure self-sufficiency. 50 At least arguably this approach rests
upon the premise that self-sufficiency is the underlying goal of both handicapped and nonhandicapped students; since the system of regular education
allows nonhandicapped children to make substantial progress toward that
objective, so should the system of special education. Second, at least one
court assumed that the opportunities available to handicapped students must
be determined by a balancing of their needs against the available resources. 51
By implication, this balancing process must likewise be used to determine
what programming would be provided nonhandicapped students. 5 2 The use
of an independent balancing calculus for each group might, in at least some
circumstances, result in comparable levels of service without the need to
engage in literal comparisons between the services afforded handicapped and
nonhandicapped students.
Finally, at least one case appears to have adopted an "equalized opportunity standard." 5 3 It is to that case-the Rowley case-that we now turn.
III
LEVEL AND EXTENT OF SERVICES: ROWLEY AND BEYOND

A.

The Rowley Decision

The facts of the Rowley 54 case are, by now, well known. 5 5 Amy Rowley, an
intelligent, highly motivated youngster, suffered, since birth, from a significant hearing impairment. Her parents, also deaf, raised Amy using the "total
communication" system of instruction, teaching her to use sign language but
also to rely on her limited residual hearing to develop excellent lipreading
skills. 5 6 When Amy entered first grade in the Hendrick Hudson School Dis50. See, e.g., Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61, 77 (S.D. Tex. 1982);
Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768, 777 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 720 F.2d 463 (6thCir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379 (1984); GladysJ. v. Pearland
Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of
Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 54 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 604 (E.D. Pa.
1979), remanded sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
51. See Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 112 (W.D. Va. 1981).
52. See Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1981). ("No language in federal law
can properly be read as mandating that costs may not be considered in determining what is appropriate for a child-handicapped or nonhandicapped.").
53. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1981) (discussed infra at notes 58-61 and accompanying text). Other
courts rejected a similar but more expansive test which would have required school districts to provide handicapped children with an education designed to allow them to achieve their maximum
potential. See, e.g., Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61, 78 (S.D. Tex 1982).
54. 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.) afd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
55. The Supreme Court's decision in Rowley has alreadyreceived substantial scholarly attention.
See, e.g., Beyer, A Free AppropriatePublic Education, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 363 (1983); Zirkel, Building
an Appropriate Public Educationfrom Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor,
42 MD.L. REV. 466 (1983); Note, Board of Education v. Rowley: The Supreme Court Takes a Conservative
Approach to the Education of Handicapped Children, 61 N.C.L. REV. 881 (1983); DuBow, EHLR Analysis:
Application of Rowley by Courts and SEAs, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) SA-107 (Supp.
93, April 1, 1983); EHLR Analysis: What Rowley Means, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)

SA-29 (Supp. 84, Nov. 12, 1982).
56. For a detailed discussion of the total communication method, and other systems of deaf
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trict, in Peekskill, New York, school administrators agreed that she should be
placed in a regular classroom and provided with a special hearing aid, a tutor
for the deaf who would meet with Amy on a daily basis, and three hours per
week of speech therapy. Amy's parents requested that she also be provided a
sign language interpreter to accompany her to class, so as to ensure that Amy
would continue to rely upon the total communication method. The school
district refused to incorporate this additional element into Amy's IEP, citing
an earlier determination that a sign language interpreter had been unnecessary to Amy during her participation in the district's kindergarten program,
and Amy's good social adjustment and better than average academic performance in the absence of such additional assistance. 5 7 The Rowleys unsuccessfully pursued state administrative remedies, and ultimately commenced
proceedings in federal district court.
The trial court held in favor of the Rowleys, concluding that the school
district's refusal to provide Amy with a sign language interpreter had, indeed,
resulted in denial of a "free appropriate public education." 5 8 The court concluded that the EAHCA's requirement that handicapped children be provided
an "appropriate" education meant that Amy should receive something more
than an "adequate" education, yet something less than an education which
would enable her to achieve her "full potential." 59 Instead, the court stated,
the Act required that Amy "be given an oportunity to achieve [her] full60potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children."In the court's view, in order to implement this standard, a reviewing court
must necessarily examine three subsidiary questions. First, the potential of
the handicapped child in question must be calculated. Second, the child's performance must be assessed and compared to his or her potential. Third, the
corresponding "shortfall" between potential and performance of the handicapped child must be compared to that experienced by nonhandicapped children. 61 In the case at hand, the court reasoned, Amy's potential-measured
by her IQ and exceptional level of energy and motivation-was great. The
shortfall in educational opportunity she suffered significantly exceeded that of
her peers, because she was burdened by a substantial hearing impairment and
they were not. 6 2 Since provision of a sign language interpreter would eliminate this incremental shortfall in educational opportunity, the school district
must supply that service. Thus, although the district purported to apply an
"equivalent opportunity" standard, what it adopted instead was an "equalized
opportunity" standard-one that required the school district to supply
whatever services were needed to minimize the effect of Amy's impairment so
education, see Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Educationfor All HandicappedChildren Act of
1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 223-40 (1980).
57. 458 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).
58. Id. at 176.
59. 483 F. Supp. at 534.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 535.
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that she might benefit, to the fullest extent possible, from the educational
opportunities available to nonhandicapped students.
A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed on appeal. 6 3 In a per curiam
ruling, expressly limiting the holding to the facts at hand without any precedential value, 64 the appellate majority adopted the district court's reasoning
by reference. Judge Mansfield dissented. He urged that an equivalent opportunity standard should be applied in order to ensure that each handicapped
child receive an education that would enable him to be as free as reasonably
possible from dependence on others. 65 In his opinion, this standard had been
satisfied under the facts at bar.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 6 6 Not surprisingly, however,
the Justices were sharply divided, their three opinions reflecting a full range
of equality-based approaches to resolving the ambiguity in the EAHCA's free
appropriate public education requirement.
Writing for himself and four others, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
laxest of the available standards-the "some benefit" standard-should apply.
Resting his analysis upon the statutory text and the legislative history, 6 7 he
first stated that the EAHCA's requirements could be satisfied "by providing [a
handicapped child with] personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.- 68 In
discussing the application of that standard, he noted that Congress had
intended "that the services provided handicapped children be educationally
beneficial, whatever the nature or severity of their handicap," 69 and that "the
benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite varia'70
tions in between."
Justice Rehnquist was careful to observe that the Court did not attempt
"to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act." 7 1 On the facts at hand,
however, the majority determined that the test had been satisfied. The Court
cited several factors which it believed supported this conclusion: (1) Amy's
needs had been specially considered by school administrators; (2) she was
receiving special services responsive to her needs; (3) she was enrolled in a
regular classroom in which her educational progress was monitored and evaluated as examinations were given, grades awarded, and retention and promotion decisions reached; and (4) she was performing adequately in this
63.
64.
65.

632 F.2d 945 (1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Id. at 948 & n.7.
Id. at 953.

66. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
67. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text. The majority also emphasized Congress'
desire to ensure that previously unserved children would no longer be excluded from the schools or
from specialized educational services. 458 U.S. at 195-97.
68. 458 U.S. at 203.
69. Id. at 202 n.23.
70. Id. at 202.
71. Id.
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placement, attaining passing marks and advancing from grade to grade. 72
While no one of these factors alone would necessarily have been enough to
compel the Court's conclusion, 73 taken together they demonstrated that Amy
was receiving an "appropriate" education.
The majority then went on to address a second question, the scope ofjudicial review, perhaps in order to provide an alternative holding, or perhaps
simply to assure that the role of the reviewing court would not, henceforth, be
misunderstood. In their view, a two-pronged inquiry is required in actions
brought under section 1415(e)(2) of the Act: "First, has the State complied
with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized
educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" 74 Since the
EAHCA contains detailed procedural requirements designed by Congress to
afford important substantive protection, the courts should rigorously enforce
such obligations. 75 On the other hand, according to the majority, reviewing
courts must tread more carefully when engaging in direct substantive review.
They should accord "due weight" to administrative proceedings, and should
refrain from "substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for
76
those of the school authorities which they review."
In the majority's view, the Rowley dispute largely focused upon the legitimacy of the school district's decision to adopt a method of instruction other
than the total communication method (which would have relied heavily upon
the presence of a sign language interpreter). 77 Since the district court had
sought to resolve a difference in opinion concerning the best educational
methodology, rather than simply determining whether Amy had received
some educational benefit from her program of instruction, it had erred in
78
going beyond the proper scope of judicial review.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result reached by the majority, but
rejected the analytical approach of the Rehnquist opinion in favor of an intermediate "equivalent opportunity" interpretation of the FAPE requirement.
In Justice Blackmun's view, the critical issue was whether Amy Rowley's educational program, "viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that
given her nonhandicapped classmates." 79 In his opinion, the equivalent
72. Id. at 203 & n.25.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 206-07. The Court has recently reiterated its view that the EAHCA both creates "an
elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of handicapped children" and "establishes an
enforceable substantive right to a free appropriate education," Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457,
3468-69 (1984), and has stated that a reviewing court must satisfy itself that a child's IEP "conforms
with the requirements of § 1401(19) [defining such plans]," Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104
S. Ct. 3371, 3377 n.6 (1984).
75. 458 U.S. at 205-06.
76. Id. at 206.
77. Id. at 184-86.
78. Id. at 207-08 & n.29, 209-10.
79. Id. at 211 (emphasis omitted).
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opportunity standard was preferable both to the Rehnquist standard, which
focused too narrowly on a handicapped child's achievement of a particular
educational outcome (passing from grade to grade), and to the lower court's
standard, which focused too narrowly on the presence or absence of a particular service rather than on the handicapped child's overall program. 80 Since
Amy's program, taken as a whole, did offer her an educational opportunity
substantially equivalent to that afforded her classmates, it satisfied the
requirements of the Act.
Justice White, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented, preferring an "equalized opportunity" interpretation of the FAPE
obligation. In the view of these three Justices, the Act's guarantee of a free
appropriate public education was "intended to eliminate the effects of the
handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible." 8 1 Since the aid of a sign language
interpreter would effectively equalize Amy's opportunity to learn, one should
have been provided.8 2 Moreover, the dissenters concluded, the lower courts
had been correct in undertaking a "full and searching" 8 3 judicial inquiry;
Congress's explicit provision for independent judicial review contemplated
just that.
B.

Critique and Afterword

The Supreme Court's decision in Rowley may be criticized on at least one
score: none of the three competing opinions withstands close analytical scrutiny. Each places a different slant on the ambiguous text and nonspecific legislative history described above. 84 Yet, because of that ambiguity and lack of
specificity, none is able to refute the opposing views in an effective or con85
vincing manner.
Rather than engaging in a protracted discussion of the justifications
offered in support of the majority, concurrence, and dissent, it is therefore
more profitable to proceed directly to the heart of the matter by assessing the
substantive merits of these three views. This section will accordingly examine
the implications of the majority's standard to determine whether it assures
handicapped children sufficient educational programming to provide them
with meaningful educational opportunities. It will then discuss the viability of
alternative standards, such as those favored by the concurrence and dissent, in
order to ascertain whether a more generous standard was in fact available and
might instead have been adopted. It will conclude that, when judged from
80. Id.
81. Id. at 215.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 218.
84. See supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
85. Both the majority and the dissent relied upon harsh words and competing portions of the
legislative history to support their diverse views. Compare 458 U.S. at 190 n. 11 (majority's criticism of
dissent) and id. at 191-200 (majority's review of legislative history) with id. at 212 (dissent's criticism
of majority) and id. at 213-14, 217-18 (dissent's review of legislative history).
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this perspective, the majority's standard represents a sound and perhaps inevitable interpretation of the Act's FAPE requirement.
1. Assurance of meaningful educationalopportunity. Whether meaningful educational opportunity will be afforded handicapped students as a result of the
Rowley decision will depend upon the interplay of the two critical issues discussed in that decision-first, the substantive standard governing programming decisions, and second, the scope of judicial review.
A threshold question is whether Rowley's "some benefit" standard requires
a single-pronged or double-pronged substantive inquiry. It might be contended that Rowley merely contemplates that each handicapped child receive
some net educational benefit, without attempting to measure that benefit
against the child's individual goals and objectives.8 6 A much stronger case
can be made for a two-pronged approach, however, since the EAHCA specifically provides that each child's educational program is to be designed with his
individual needs in mind.8 7 If the sufficiency of the programming to be provided is not similarly assessed with the child's unique abilities, needs, and
objectives in mind, that requirement would be largely nugatory. The Rowley
decision itself specifically recognized that the "some benefit" standard could
only be applied after careful consideration of each individual child's abilities,
needs, and objectives.8 8 Accordingly, a two-pronged analysis of the substantive sufficiency of educational programming should be employed: This analysis requires both careful examination of the child's abilities, needs, and
objectives, and an assessment of whether he is receiving some educational
benefit as measured against those objectives.
The first prong of this test-examination of the child's abilities, needs, and
objectives-is particularly critical. In the absence of careful and accurate
judgments on these issues, the second-stage inquiry into benefit derived will
be based upon an incorrect benchmark, virtually assuring that the child will
not receive an "appropriate" education. Thus, if a child's goals and objectives are set at a very modest level as a result of an incorrect diagnosis of
mental retardation or an erroneous assessment of the extent to which his
mental capacity is impaired, an inquiry into his attainment of the established
goals would fail to ensure that he has, in fact, received educational programming which "meets his unique needs."-8

9

Following Rowley, it is therefore

quite likely that more attention will be focused upon the nature of individual
86. The Rowley majority at times uses broad language which could provide support for such a
view. See, e.g., 458 U.S. at 195 ("the Act imposes no clear obligation upon recipient States beyond
the requirement that handicapped children receive some form of specialized education"); id.at 196
(Congress sought to ensure that handicapped children were "served" and " 'served' referred to children who were receiving some form of specialized educational services").
87. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) quoted in text accompanying note 32 supra.
88. See 458 U.S. at 202, 203 n.25 (observing that the Court did not intend to hold that "every
child who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school system is automatically
receiving a 'free appropriate public education,' " but that Amy Rowley had received such an education in view of her actual progress, the services she had received, and the "professional consideration" she had been afforded).
89. See, e.g., Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 55 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
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handicapped children's disabilities. The precise nature of such children's
educational needs-including needs for emotional as well as intellectual
development-is also likely to become an even more prominent factor in educational programming decisions. 90 Finally, an increased number of challenges may well be directed to the adequacy of the objectives and goals stated
in the child's IEP, 9 1 for unless those objectives are detailed and comprehensive in character, review of the sufficiency of educational benefits received
must, at best, be cursory.
Under this first prong of the substantive inquiry into the adequacy of educational programming, judicial review may be limited when the school and the
parents agree on a particular child's abilities, needs, and objectives. 92 In the
event of disagreement, however, that review should be more probing. Such
review necessitates careful review of professional diagnoses of the child's
handicapping condition and evaluations of the impairment to his learning
abilities that exists as a result. These issues are, by and large, factual in character. 93 In discussing the standard of review for such factual issues, some
lower courts have tended to limit the Supreme Court's caution in Rowley,
regarding factual review of school districts' judgments, to disagreements
about educational methodology. 94 Courts have also concluded that "due
weight" is afforded determinations by state and local hearing officers on
other, nonmethodological issues so long as evidence adduced and findings
reached in administrative proceedings are not wholly ignored by the trial
court. 9 5 The trial court thus retains the ultimate responsibility of making fac-

tual findings on such issues as the handicapped child's abilities, needs, and
(FAPE not provided where program for severely mentally retarded boy did not take into account his
individual needs and abilities.).
90. See, e.g., Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1033-35 (5th Cir. 1983) (must assess needs);
Lee v. Thompson, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 554:429 (D. Hawaii 1983) (must consider nature and severity of handicap and areas of learning crucial to attaining self-sufficiency); In re
J.B., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:319 (Vt. SEA 1983) (must first consider child's
needs to determine whether vocational educational programming is appropriate); see also infra part IV
for discussion of scope of educational needs for purposes of the EAHCA.
91. See, e.g., Case No. SE-99-80, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. 504:267 (Ill. SEA 1983)
(dispute regarding suitability of academic versus vocational objectives); In re Hershey Pub. School
Dist. No. 37, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:225 (Neb. SEA 1982) (same).

92. This was apparently the case in Rowley. See 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 632 F.2d
945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1981).
93. See, e.g., Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1983); Case No. SE-99-80, 1982-83
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:267 (Ill. SEA 1983).

94. See, e.g., Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 196
(1983).
95. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 1983). But see Roncker v.
Walker, 700 F.2d at 1062 (trial court failed to accord due weight when reversing decision of local and
state hearing officers that proposed programming was inappropriate). Roncker may suggest that a
differential standard of review is being applied depending on whether state and local hearing officers
uphold or reject a local school district's decision. A federal court may fear that a hearing officer's
decision in favor of a local school district may reflect favoritism toward the district's point of view,
and may, therefore, step in to protect the interest of the handicapped children whom the EAHCA is
designed to protect. Such a court may be inclined to give greater deference to determinations by
hearing officers which necessarily reflect an independent judgment which differs from that of the
school district, triggering no similar fear of favoritism.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 48: No. 1

objectives.9 6 In reaching such decisions, trial courts and hearing officers are
nevertheless likely to treat professional judgments as particularly persuasive,
especially where such judgments are those of teachers or other personnel who
have worked with the handicapped child over an extended period. 9 7 They
may also give serious consideration to the insights of parents, who in many
cases have considerable knowledge of their child's abilities and needs, regardless of their backgrounds in educational methodology. 9 s
Assessment of the benefit afforded by the educational programming in
question, under the second prong of the substantive standard, is likewise of

great importance. The Supreme Court's decision in Rowley has shaped this
inquiry in two key respects. First, while the benefit afforded must ultimately

be evaluated in light of an individual child's narrow educational objectives,
benefit itself is not a narrow concept. Instead, it includes the net advantages
gained, not simply from one facet, but from the whole of the child's educational environment-the educational methods used, the personnel employed,
the intensity of services afforded. Accordingly, following Rowley, attention has
turned to the general benefit derived from the total mix of services offered a
handicapped child-his overall educational opportunity-rather than the ade-

quacy or inadequacy of a single aspect of his educational program. 99 Second,
the Court clearly stated that the benefit afforded need not be sufficient to
allow the child in question to actually attain his full educational potential. 0 0
The Court indicated that the sufficiency of the child's educational programming is to be judged by his performance in making incremental progress
toward his individual educational goals. It thus established an objective
threshold standard of sufficiency that appears to guarantee each handicapped
child at least minimal eductional opportunity.
96. Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d at 230; School Comm. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ.
(Burlington), 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3414 (Dec. 4, 1984). A
more limited federal interest thus exists to justify intervention by the federal courts under these
circumstances. School Comm. v Massachusetts Dep't of Educ. (Burlington), 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st
Cir. 1984) (adopting "a symmetrical" approach envisioning greater judicial deference to decision of
state hearing officers determining that IEP did not comply with requirements of state law), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3414 (Dec. 4, 1984).
97.

See, e.g., In re West Brookfield Pub. Schools, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)

504:166 (Mass. SEA 1982) (home teacher); In re Brockton Pub. Schools, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:128 (Mass. SEA 1982) (primary teacher, therapists, evaluators); In re Dixie
School Dist. and Marin County Special Educ. Consortium, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP.

(CRR) 504:274 (Cal. SEA 1983) (current teachers and interpreter).
98. See Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 522 F. Supp. 1102, 1109 (D.D.C. 1981) (parents' views are to be thoroughly considered; may be biased or highly probative); In re Madison Metropolitan School Dist.,

1981-82 EDUC.

HANDICAPPED

L. REP. (CRR) 503:125 (Wis. SEA 1981)

(parents' wishes are to be considered, but do not control). But see Johnston v. Ann Arbor Pub.
Schools, 569 F. Supp. 1502, 1509 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (refusing to substitute mother's judgment for
judgment of professionals).
99. See, e.g., Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 720 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 1983) (mix of services
adequate without provision of summer classes and occupational therapy), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379
(1984). Cothern v. Mallory, 565 F. Supp. 701, 707-08 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (considering teacher
training, integration with nonhandicapped children, and other factors).
100. See 458 U.S. at 192 (quoting Senate report which expressly recognized that "in many
instances the process of providing special education and related services to handicapped children is
not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome").
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Whether even this minimal opportunity will in fact be afforded depends,
however, upon the judicial review applied to this second, assessment-of-benefit facet of the test for substantive sufficiency of educational programming.
Most of Rowley's strong cautionary language regarding the scope of judicial
review seemed to be addressed to this prong of the analysis, since there was
little question regarding Amy's abilities, needs, or objectives. Not surprisingly, several competing interpretations of the Court's statements regarding
the scope of judicial review are possible. One view is based on the Court's
repeated references to the broad authority of state and local school officials
over questions of educational policy. Under this view, since all programming
determinations involve decisions about educational methodology to some
degree, school officials, not the courts, should be allowed to determine what
constitutes adequate educational benefits, either during the local IEP development or the state administrative review process. For example, the courts
would largely defer to school officials' determination of whether a seriously
learning disabled child, who also suffered from associated emotional
problems, would derive "some" educational "benefit" from instruction in a
self-contained classroom with a 10 to 1 pupil-teacher ratio, or whether a more
individualized, highly structured, and closely supervised program would
instead be required.' 0 '
Alternatively, the Court's remarks could be seen to limit the scope ofjudicial review only in relatively few cases, where parents disagree with school
officials regarding which of several professionally acceptable techniques or
modes of instruction should be employed.' 0 2 Under this view, trial courts
would remain relatively free to reach independent, de novo judgments
regarding the sufficiency of educational programming in other respects.
The appropriate scope of judicial review under the second prong of
Rowley's substantive standard probably lies somewhere between these two
extremes. The Court's rather indiscriminate references to educational
method and policy probably were not limited to theories of instruction. 0 3 At
the same time, the Court did not suggest that school officials' judgments on
these questions should go altogether unchecked. Instead, the Court specifically directed that reviewing courts were to determine whether the mix of
methods, personnel, and other facets of a child's educational program carried
101. This view was rejected in Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1983). However,
other courts have adopted such a view on comparable facts. SeeJohnston v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schools,
569 F. Supp. at 1507-09 (court hesitated to substitute its judgment for that of school official in case
involving 11-year-old girl with cerebral palsy who requested placement in specialized school for
physically impaired after experiencing significant learning difficulties in local placement); see also
Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 720 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that programming decisions are within state's discretion, but holding, in the alternative, that requested services were unnecessary), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379 (1984).
102. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing decisions
regarding methodology from those regarding mainstreaming), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 196 (1983).
103. The Court undertook an extended discussion of the scope of review, warning reviewing
courts against using a free hand to impose substantive standards of review which are not derived
from the Act itself and emphasizing that Congress had intended the Act's procedural requirements
to assure compliance with its substantive requirements. 458 U.S. at 206.
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him across the statutory threshold, immunizing him from harm, and assuring
him of some incremental progress toward his objectives. 10 4 Because these
latter questions are questions of fact, 10 5 they may be addressed by the courts
without fear of violating state and local prerogatives to determine the means
used to reach a statutorily mandated end.
Again under this factual review, the courts will undoubtedly accord considerable weight to the professional judgments of school personnel. 10 6 At the
same time, the child's track record is likely to be more compelling evidence
than educators' projections. 10 7 In doubtful cases, a court may order especially
close monitoring of a child's progress to assure that his educational program
will be modified if the minimum opportunity is not provided.' 0 8 In other
cases, especially where the child is so seriously impaired that a marginally
effective educational program creates substantial risks (risk of harm through
regression, or the risk of inability to make even some progress toward identified educational objectives), the court may well find that the program is inadequate.10 9 In such instances, it is likely that the court or other reviewing body
will order some specific remedy-a change in instructional personnel, a
change in the type or level of sevices provided, or some other program modification-rather than leaving completely to school officials the decision
regarding the proper scope of the child's program."10
Thus, the decision in Rowley appears to guarantee that, under the EAHCA,
handicapped children will receive at least a minimally adequate education,
one that is designed to meet their individual abilities, needs, and objectives
and that will assist them in achieving at least some progress toward their
goals. Although the authority of reviewing courts has been limited in at least
some respects, they may be expected to continue to play a key role in ensuring
that this threshold statutory standard is met. The standard adopted by the
Rowley majority is, on its face, a sound one. This judgment is further confirmed by a comparative analysis of the more generous alternative standards
proposed by the Rowley concurrence and dissent.
2. Availability of Alternative Standards. Examination of possible alternative
standards suggests that the Supreme Court in Rowley bowed to the inevitable
104. Id. at 203 n.25 (determining that Amy Rowley received appropriate education in view of
professional consideration received, special services provided, and academic progress achieved).
105. See Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 1983); Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d
800, 806 & n.12 (1st Cir. 1982), on remand, 561 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1983), afd, 728 F.2d 30 (ist
Cir. 1984).
106. See, e.g., Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221, 1225-26 (D. Mass. 1982).
107. See Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d at 807-08.
108. See In re Burton School Dist., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:133 (Cal.
SEA 1982); see also Laura M. v. Special School Dist. # 1, 1980-81 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)
552:152 (D. Minn. 1980).
109. See, e.g., In re Burton School Dist., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:133
(Cal. SEA 1982); In re Putnam City School Dist., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:207
(Okla. SEA 1982).
110. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983) (custodial services for
severely retarded child); In re Scottsbluff Pub. School, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)
504:238 (Neb. SEA 1982) (preschool service for profoundly deaf child).
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in adopting a "some benefit" standard for determining the sufficiency of educational programming under the EAHCA. The Court selected the only one of
the three possible standards which avoided problems ofjusticiability that have
long influenced the development of equal educational opportunity jurisprudence. Academic and judicial discussion ofjusticiability during the last twenty
years has focused on two principal concerns. First, federal courts have hesitated to assume the task of allocating public resources in an equitable fashion
to assure equality of opportunity."' The courts have long understood that
the process of resource allocation is, by its nature, largely a political one.
Except where a disadvantaged group is denied all opportunity (a strong indication that the political process has gone awry and that judicial intervention is
warranted), or inhumane conditions exist,' 1 2 the courts have generally concluded that resolution of political disputes should be left to the legislative
arena. 3 This general hesitancy to assume responsibilities for resource allo4
cation has applied equally in the educational context."
Second, the courts have recognized that, even apart from resource allocation problems, it is particularly difficult to develop judicially manageable standards for determining whether educational opportunities have been allocated
in an "equal" fashion. 1 5 Many scholars agree that "educational opportunity"
does not refer to educational "output," that is, an individual's achievement of
noneducational goals by using the intellectual and practical skills he acquired
through education, as well as his own talent, energy, and other available
resources." 6 Assuming that educational opportunity is defined in terms of
"input," rather than "output," a question arises as to the precise "input" to
be measured, for example, monetary contributions versus other more intangible resources. 1 7 In addition, scholars differ on the proper measurement of
the sufficiency of that "input" to meet affected children's needs." 8 Courts
have hesitated to undertake a comparison of the opportunities afforded on a
school district by school district basis."t 9 Comparison on a child-by-child basis
could only prove significantly more cumbersome.
The "some benefit" standard surmounts both these justiciability concerns.
First, it allows the courts to confine their involvement in resource allocation
decisions within traditionally acceptable bounds. Rather than having to balance myriad competing claims to limited available resources, courts only must
111. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
112. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, (M.D. Ala. 1972) (inhumane conditions in
institution for mentally retarded), aff'd in part, remanded in part, sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (inhumane prison conditions), aft'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
113. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
114. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).

115. See id. at 42; Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
968 (1981); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335-36 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (three judge panel), aff'd
sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
116. See, e.g., Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 8, at 972-73; Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1373.
117. Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1369-70.
118. Id. at 1371-72.
119. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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assure that no individual is denied resources needed to allow him to receive
effective, personalized instruction, and thus at least minimal access to an
important, publicly funded opportunity. The "some benefit" standard thus
allows the courts to adopt the least intrusive possible posture in dealing with
resource allocation questions. They can require schools, without exception,
to provide all students with a minimum level of opportunity, while leaving to
school officials the task of allocating available resources that exceed this
1 20
amount as they see fit.
Second, the "some benefit" standard provides judicially manageable criteria for determining whether equal educational opportunity has been
afforded. On the one hand, it assumes that opportunity comprises the sum
total of all facets of a handicapped child's educational environment, thereby
shielding a reviewing court from demands that it evaluate the adequacy of
independent components of that environment-for example, teaching skill, or
method and intensity of instruction-which are peculiarly insusceptible to
judicial review. On the other hand, it requires the reviewing court to assess
the adequacy of the child's educational program in practical and measureable
terms, by focusing on the individual handicapped child alone, without the
need for assessing and comparing the opportunity afforded any other children
enrolled in the public school system. As in Rowley, a court need only inquire
whether the child's needs and objectives have been properly determined (e.g.,
was the extent of Amy's hearing impairment accurately diagnosed and her
instructional objectives reasonably defined to include at least normal academic progress for a child of her age?), and whether the child can reasonably
be expected to make some discernible progress toward those objectives (Can
Amy continue to achieve at or above normal grade level?).
Neither of the competing alternative standards could similarly surmount
these two longstanding justiciability concerns. Each of the possible formulations of the "equivalent opportunity" test runs afoul of one or another justiciability problem. Under the more viable of the two pre-Rowley "equivalent
opportunity" approaches, for example, a reviewing court would be required
to balance the opportunity afforded the handicapped child against the
resources available. Therefore, a court would be required to engage directly
in the allocation of public resources, without the assistance of any judicially
manageable guidelines. 1 1 Under Justice Blackmun's approach in Rowley,
direct comparison of opportunities afforded handicapped and nonhandicapped children would be required, again with no hint of how the possibly
very different components of these educational programs would be assessed,
averaged, and translated into units appropriate for comparison.
Similarly, the "equalized opportunity" standard is seriously flawed. In
theory, this standard would not require direct consideration of allocation
issues. Instead, school districts would have to afford those services needed to
120.
CONTEMP.

121.

See Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmakingfor the Handicapped Child,
PROBS., Spring 1985, at 7.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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minimize the effects of a child's handicapping condition, regardless of cost,
unless they could offer a statutory cost defense.1 2 2 In practice, however, there
would undoubtedly be insufficient resources to provide the optimal services
necessary to overcome the effects of a child's handicap to the maximum extent
possible. The courts would thus be inexorably drawn into allocating the
resulting shortfall in overall resources between handicapped and nonhandicapped students. Since no judicially manageable standards for that process of
allocation are provided, this option is an unpalatable one.
Even if the sufficiency of public resources posed no problem, an additional
difficulty would remain. Under the equalized opportunity test, the court
would be expected to determine whether the educational services provided
were those which most nearly minimized the effects of a particular child's
handicap, thereby allowing him to benefit as fully as possible from the opportunities afforded nonhandicapped students. This task is a troublesome one.
As was the case in Rowley, the standard would draw the courts into deciding,
on a recurring basis, which of several possible techniques should be used to
minimize the effects of a child's handicap as fully as possible. Since there is
often considerable professional disagreement concerning which is the "best"
instructional technique currently available, use of the "equalized opportunity" standard would force the courts to resolve issues that are peculiarly
beyond the judicial province. Thus, for this reason as well, the "equalized
opportunity" standard presents serious justiciability problems.
Recent developments under state special education statutes confirm these
observations. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley, it was predicted that state courts might choose to impose a more stringent standard
under state law than that adopted by the Court for purposes of the
EAHCA.1 23 Although litigants have attempted to invoke a more stringent
state standard in a number of administrative appeals and cases, the approach
has generally been unsuccessful. 12 4 In several instances, it has been determined that state law requires the adoption of educational objectives that
reflect a handicapped child's maximum potential. 25 However, no more than
measurable progress toward those objectives has generally been required,
122. See Bartlett, supra note 120, at 38.
123. See Zirkel, supra note 55, at 487-91.
124. See, e.g., Max M. v. Thompson, 566 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (interpreting Illinois law);
Cothern v. Mallory, 565 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (interpreting Missouri law); Harrell v. Wilson
County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982), appeal dismissed, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d
759, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983); In re Traverse Bay Area Intermediate School Dist., 1982-83
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:140 (Mich. SEA 1982); cf. Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub.
Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1982) (pre-Rowley decision).
125. See Cothern v. Mallory, 565 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (Missouri statute requires
schools to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped children); Harrell v. Wilson
County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 265, 293 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1982) (interpreting North Carolina
State statute guaranteeing an "appropriate" education in light of legislative purpose to ensure every
child an opportunity to achieve his full potential and concluding that statute embodied standard
proposed by Rowley dissenters); In re Traverse Bay Area Intermediate School Dist., 1982-83 EDUC.
HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:140 (Mich. SEA 1982) (interpreting Michigan state statute as
requiring provision of education designed to achieve child's maximum potential); Buchholtz v. Iowa
Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1982) (interpreting Iowa statute to require
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consistent with the federal "some benefit" test.' 2 6
In sum, the Supreme Court in Rowley very likely had little choice but to
adopt a "some benefit" standard for determining the sufficiency of educational programming under the EAHCA. While that standard does not afford
the degree of protection that some advocates would prefer, it continues to
afford courts adequate leeway to ensure that some meaningful educational
opportunity is afforded each handicapped child.
IV
SCOPE OF EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

As has just been described, a handicapped child's abilities and attendant
needs, goals and objectives, play a critical role in determining the level and
extent of services provided pursuant to the EAHCA. A second, related question accordingly comes readily to mind: What range of needs must school
districts address in developing a child's educational program?
Careful analysis of this question is required, for the stakes are high. If the
range of needs to be addressed under the EAHCA ("educational needs") is a
narrow one, and schools are relieved of any obligation to provide services
which respond to noneducational needs, the extent of services available under
the Act may be significantly curtailed. If, on the other hand, educational
needs are defined as very broad in scope, school districts may regularly face
demands for a wide array of very expensive noninstructional services. Not
surprisingly, for example, the scope of educational needs to be addressed
under the Act has become a recurrent question in cases in which parents have
requested placement of severely impaired children in intensive, comprehensive residential programs. School districts have agreed, in many instances, to
cover costs of instructional services attendant to such placements. However,
they have declined to pay for expensive 27 counseling, custodial and medical
services which often form an integral part of such residential programs,
arguing that such noninstructional services address noneducational needs
provision of a level of education commensurate with the level provided each child who does not
receive special education).
126. See Cothern v. Mallory, 565 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (programming provided child
with Down's syndrome sufficient under both state and federal standards despite parents requests for
additional services and more fully trained personnel); Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C.
App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982) (hearing impaired child received sufficient education under both
federal and state standards where she was placed in mainstream setting with unspecified amount of
assistance from resource personnel and was "progressing with her studies"); In re Traverse Bay Area
Intermediate School Dist. 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:140 (Mich. SEA 1982)
(profoundly hearing impaired child need not be provided cued speech interpreter while enrolled in
mainstream classes for substantial part of day, notwithstanding state statute incorporating maximum
potential standards); Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1982)
(child with learning disability not guaranteed "best" education available in neighboring school district under Iowa "commensurate education" standard). But see David D. v. Dartmouth School
Comm., 1984-85 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 556:215 (D. Mass. 1984) (awarding relief based
on more protective Massachusetts state law); Geis v. Board of Educ., 1984-85 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L.
REP. (CRR) 556:208 (D.NJ. 1984) (awarding relief based on more protective New Jersey state law).
127. See Stanger v. Ambach, 501 F. Supp. 1237, 1241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing residential
placement that would cost $53,832 for the 1980-81 year); Stark, supra note 11.
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outside the realm of their statutory obligations. 2 8 Parents, on the other
hand, have urged that the full range of instructional and noninstructional
services are needed to allow their child to make even minimal educational
progress, and that such programming should accordingly be deemed to
address educational needs.
Debate over the scope of educational needs may be motivated by practical
concerns to avoid substantial drains on limited school budgets and to protect
the welfare of severely impaired children, but it is often waged in more theoretical terms which once again can fruitfully be examined by reference to the
concept of equal educational opportunity. The position of many school districts that the scope of educational needs under the Act should be narrowly
defined rests on the unstated premises that the EAHCA is designed to assure
equal educational opportunity, and that such opportunity can best be defined
by reference to the traditional school system. In that context, educational
needs are commonly understood to be synonymous with needs uniquely and
historically addressed by educational institutions, through provision of
instructional services by trained personnel. Noneducational needs are those
historically addressed by other institutions, through the provision of other
types of services by personnel with different sorts of training. Under this
approach, a dichotomy is assumed to exist between mutually exclusive classes
of educational and noneducational needs. If this exclusionary approach were
incorporated as an aid in determining the scope of needs to be addressed
under the EAHCA, it would therefore follow that programming which meets
noneducational needs falls outside the range of schools' statutory obligations.
A different view of equal educational opportunity has underlain arguments
of parents and advocates in support of a broader interpretation of the scope
of educational needs under the EAHCA. They have claimed that the Act contemplates a more substantial modification of the traditional approach to
defining schools' responsibilities to address children's educational needs, and
have urged that the traditional dichotomy between educational and noneducational needs be recast or replaced by an inclusionary approach to the definition of educational needs. Under this view, the assumption that educational
and noneducational needs are mutually exclusive would be rejected, and programming required to address a child's educational needs would be provided,
even though it simultaneously responds to noneducational needs.
Section A explores the guidance provided by the text of the Act and
agency regulations regarding which of these alternative interpretations should
be employed. Section B demonstrates that the weight of case law has correctly adopted a broad inclusionary approach to delineating those needs that
are to be regarded as educational in character, for purposes of the EAHCA.

128. School districts have also urged that placement in residential programs would violate the
statutory requirement that handicapped children be educated in the least restrictive environment.
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Statutory and Regulatory Text

While neither statutory text nor pertinent regulatory provisions are free of
ambiguity, both suggest that a broad inclusionary interpretation of educational needs is preferable. Educational need, for purposes of the EAHCA,
cannot be understood by referring to a single section of the statute. Instead,
one must discern the significance of several interlocking provisions. The definitions of "special education" and "related services" provide a critical starting
point. The special education component of a child's free appropriate public
education is to include "instruction

.

.

. to meet [his] unique needs."

129

This

unqualified reference to the child's needs suggests that the instruction in
question may have to address the full spectrum of needs experienced by the
child. In addition, the related services to be provided are defined in broad
terms. For example, "supportive" and "psychological services" may be
required, services which necessarily both foster a child's academic perform30
ance and respond to his emotional needs.'
A limit upon school systems' obligations to meet handicapped children's
needs appears elsewhere in the Act, however. Special education and related
services must be supplied only as required to ensure that a child receive a free
appropriate public education.' 3 ' EAHCA defines that education, in turn, as
the composite of services identified through the IEP development process.1 3 2
The IEP is to include a "statement of present levels of educational performance," a statement of "annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives," and criteria for determining whether these objectives are being
3

achieved. 13

This language could be interpreted narrowly as focusing upon the process
of instruction, confirming some schools' exclusionary view that emotional and
custodial needs remain beyond the scope of their responsibilities. However, a
broader interpretation seems more supportable. The educational performance and instructional goals in question are those of the full range of handicapped children identified elsewhere in the Act. 13 4 Thus, because of their
seriously impaired abilities, some children require instruction in coping and
self-care skills in addition to, or instead of, traditional academic instruction.
Congress was fully advised of this fact during extensive hearings which preceded the EAHCA's enactment. 35 Moreover, Congress was also aware that it
might be impossible to provide instruction that allows such children to make
even limited progress toward the attainment of these skills except through
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1982).
130. See infra text accompanying note 175 for quotation of this portion of the "related services"
definition.
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982) (a definition of "free appropriate public education" is quoted
supra at note 27).
132. Id.
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982).
134. See supra note 25 for the definition of "handicapped children" which includes mentally
retarded and seriously emotionally disturbed children.
135. See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 99, 391-92, 798, 808.
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means that simultaneously address their emotional and custodial care
needs. 136 The better reading of these provisions is, therefore, that they justify
a broad inclusionary interpretation.
Agency regulations, while also ambiguous, appear likewise to support this
broad view. EAHCA regulations regarding the availability of residential programming state: "If placement in a public or private residential program is
necessary to provide special education and related services to a handicapped
child, the program, including nonmedical care and room and board, must be
at no cost to the parents of the child."' 3 7 A cryptic comment accompanying
the rule has proved more important than the statutory text: "This requirement applies to placements which are made by public agencies for educational
purposes.
... 138 This regulation, and the accompanying comment, clearly
indicate that schools may have to address custodial care needs. Moreover, the
regulators' reference to "educational purposes," rather than "educational
needs," may suggest a desire to abandon the traditional dichotomy between
educational and noneducational needs. The word "purposes" can reasonably
be seen to embrace a wider range of needs, in effect redefining the notion of
educational needs in a more comprehensive fashion such as that required by
the inclusionary interpretation under consideration here. The regulation is
not, however, altogether free from ambiguity in this regard. One construction of the reference to "educational purposes" is that it is an express recognition that some residential placements may be made because of children's
emotional needs, and that those placements need not be funded publicly. The
regulation, though, makes no reference to schools' responsibilities to address
custodial care needs which exist in nonresidential settings and which may likewise give rise to educational needs or affect schools' abilities to address
instructional needs in an effective fashion. Although the statutory and regulatory text provides some guidance concerning the definition of educational
needs to be adopted for purposes of the EAHCA, it is not surprising that the
issue has continued to spur debate and has accordingly required resolution by
administrative hearing officers and by the courts.
B.

Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Interpretations

As suggested above, there is a pronounced split in quasi-judicial and judicial interpretations of the scope of educational needs which must be
addressed under the EAHCA. The following discussion examines and evaluates a typical administrative hearing officer decision adopting a narrow exclusionary approach, and then traces the courts' development of a better
reasoned inclusionary interpretation.

136.
137.
138.

Id.
34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1984).
Id.
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1. Exclusionary Approach. In re M.J. S. is a recent New Jersey hearing officer
decision which exemplifies the exclusionary approach. 139 In that case, the
father of a 17-year-old emotionally disturbed girl requested that she be provided with residential programming. The girl had become a routine truant
and an alcohol and drug abuser following her parents' divorce. She was
placed by her parents in a residential program, where she performed above
average academically until removed for treatment and evaluation in a specialized hospital facility. The hospital staff recommended that upon release she
be placed again in a residential setting in order to receive both an appropriate
academic program and training in behavior modification accompanied by
therapy, the latter designed to deal with her emotional needs. After an unsuccessful attempt to place the girl in local programming, including some mainstream classes, the school system agreed that her educational program should
be revised. While expressing a willingness to fund the educational component of the proposed residential program, the school refused to cover other
expenses such as those associated with room and board. The board supported this position by contending that it could provide an adequate local
private day program for the girl in order to meet her educational needs. It
further contended that residential programming was being requested for
noneducational purposes-specifically to meet her emotional needs and to
relieve her father of undesired supervisory responsibilities which interfered
with his business career.
The state hearing officer generally upheld the position taken by the school
system. She stated that, although she accepted the unanimous testimony of
professional witnesses that residential programming was indicated in the case
at hand, she was convinced that such programming was required because of
separate noneducational needs:' 40 the girl's behavior and emotional
problems, and her home situation. In support of this position, the hearing
officer cited the evaluating hospital's bifurcated description of the residential
program it recommended, one which included both an academic component
and a behavior modification-therapy component.' 4 1 The fact that these two
components could be separately described served, for the hearing officer, as
ample evidence that the modification-therapy component, and thus the
overall program, was sought to address the girl's emotional needs.
139. 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:302 (N.J. SEA 1983). Other administrative hearing officer decisions involving a similar dichotomy between educational and emotional or
psychiatric needs include: In re P., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:148 (Conn. SEA
1983); Case No. 81-22, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:331 (Conn. SEA 1981); Case
No. 80-24 (Jimmy F.), 1980-81 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:109 (Conn. SEA 1980). At
least one court has adopted an exclusionary approach in distinguishing between educational and
medical needs. See McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983) (school district not
required to pay for placement of emotionally handicapped child in private psychiatric hospital where
primary purpose of placement was medical, placement was not made in support of special education
program, and services received fell within medical services exception to definition of "related services"). For further discussion of the application of the medical services exception as it relates to the
availability of psychotherapy, see part V B 2, infra. See also Stark, supra note 11, at 513-14.
140. 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:308, :309 (N.J. SEA 1983).
141. Id. at 504:308.
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The M.J.S. decision is marked by flawed logic and by insufficient factual
analysis. To begin with, the scope of the holding is unclear. The hearing
officer may have narrowly determined that the school system had no obligation to supply residential programming needed to meet a child's emotional
needs where that programming was not simultaneously required to satisfy her
educational needs to the extent required under the EAHCA's FAPE requirements. This holding would have been consistent with the facts at hand. The
hearing officer did declare the school system's proposed locally available programming "appropriate," perhaps convinced that the girl would continue to
perform at an average level academically, and that this was all that was needed
to satisfy the FAPE standard. If this is indeed the case's narrow holding, however, it is unclear why characterization of the requested programming as
meeting the girl's emotional needs was even necessary. A reviewing authority
could not require of the school district additional services which provided
more than the level of opportunity guaranteed pursuant to the FAPE standard, whether designed to meet the girl's educational or emotional needs.
Accordingly, a fair interpretation of the decision is that the hearing officer
intended a broader holding declaring that school systems have no obligation
to provide residential programming which addresses a child's educational
needs if, at the same time, that programming responds to emotional or other
noneducational needs-in essence, an adoption of the exclusionary approach.
Unfortunately, the rationale behind this intended holding is obscure. The
hearing officer may have defined educational need narrowly to exclude the
need to acquire basic nonacademic skills, so that even though a child's emotional handicap gives rise to deficiencies in coping skills, a remedy for those
deficiencies must be found outside the Act. 1 4 2 This conclusion is question142. Many disputes regarding the definition of educational needs for purposes of the EAHCA
involve disagreements between state agencies regarding overlapping responsibility for funding a particular child's placement in a residential setting. See, e.g., North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.,
471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979) (dispute regarding responsibilities of school board and social service
agency); Parks v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Development Disabilities, 110 Ill. App. 3d 184,
441 N.E.2d 1209 (1982) (dispute regarding responsibility of state board of education and state
mental health agency); D.S. v. Board of Educ., 88 N.J. Super. 592, 458 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 94 NJ.
529, 468 A.2d 184 (1983) (dispute regarding responsibility of state and local boards of education).
For an extensive discussion of this problem, see Mooney & Aronson, Solomon Revisited: Separating
Educationaland Other than EducationalNeeds in Special Education Placements, 14 CONN. L. REV. 531 (1982).
Mooney and Aronson urge that a "but for" test be adopted in order to limit schools' responsibilities
for residential placements which would be required because of emotional needs unrelated to the
educational process. Id. at 552. There are two problems with this approach which closely parallel
the problems with the M.J.S. decision itself. First, it is unclear under what circumstances emotional
needs would be found to be "unrelated" to the educational process. If that term is used to suggest
that schools need not fund residential placements where the school is required to provide a free
appropriate public education, then the term complicates the inquiry, for a simpler determination of
whether alternative programming would satisfy the Rowley standard should suffice. Alternatively, the
proposal may suggest that, where compelling emotional needs can be demonstrated, a school would
be relieved of any obligation to satisfy concomitant educational needs. While Congress specifically
contemplated that local educational agencies could seek financial assistance from other state agencies
in order to satisfy the obligations under EAHCA, Congress nevertheless envisioned that local educational agencies would remain ultimately responsible for provision of needed services. See S. REP. No.
168; 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 24, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1446, 1448. While
the Mooney and Aronson test might serve as a mechanism for allocating financial responsibility
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able in light of the previously cited evidence of Congress' intent that the
schools assist handicapped children to acquire fundamental nonacademic
skills in cases in which a particular disability prevents children from acquiring
such skills through more informal contact with parents and other members of
43
the community. 1
Alternatively, the hearing officer may have defined educational needs narrowly to exclude those that only indirectly influence educational performance.
Thus she may have believed that the child in question possessed adequate
coping skills which rendered attention to her emotional needs unnecessary,
even though those needs indirectly affected her ability to make meaningful
progress toward instructional goals and objectives as required under the definition of a free appropriate public education. This view is similarly flawed.
Congress' insistence that each handicapped child receive a free appropriate
public education dominates the statute and its legislative history. 14 4 The Congress authorized schools to employ a wide range of related services as tools to
achieve this result, at least some of which work only indirectly to facilitate 4a5
handicapped child's attainment of his individual educational goals.'
Requiring schools to address underlying emotional needs which affect a
child's educational achievement would be consistent with this strategy and
would work in favor of Congress' paramount remedial objective. A narrower
interpretation, which instead undercuts the attainment of that objective,
should accordingly be rejected.
2. Inclusionary Approach. In light of the flaws evident in the exclusionary
approach, it is not surprising that the alternative inclusionary approach now
commands substantial judicial support. The courts' acceptance of this
approach did not come easily, though, but can be traced over a period of
several years.
The first step in the development of this approach occurred in North v.
District of Columbia Board of Education. 146 North involved efforts to procure residential programming for a seriously emotionally disturbed 16-year-old boy
who also suffered from learning disabilities and epilepsy. An initial residential
placement proved unsuccessful when the provider was unable to deal with his
emotional and other problems. The school system refused to arrange another
similar placement, arguing that it could provide an adequate day program to
meet his educational needs, that residential programming was required only
between local educational agencies and other state and local agencies, at least for purposes of state
budgetary or accounting practice, other more viable alternatives are probably available. See Stoppleworth, Mooney & Aronson Revisited: A Less than Solomon-Like Solution to the Problem of ResidentialPlacement of Handicapped Children, 15 CONN. L. REV. 757 (1983). In any event, their proposed approach
cannot limit the ultimate responsibility of local agencies as a matter of federal law.
143. See supra notes 135-36.
144. See supra note 26; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(C) (1976) (statement of purpose); S. REP. No.
168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1433; H.R. REP. No. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7.
145. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (related services include psychological and counseling services).
146. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
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to satisfy his emotional needs, and that the appropriate social service agency,
not the school system, should bear the attendant costs of such programming.
The court rejected the school system's plea. The court stated that in some
instances dilemmas of the sort presented would be better resolved through
the instigation of neglect proceedings which would place the ultimate respon147
sibility for a seriously impaired child's welfare with a social service agency.
Where, however, as in the case at hand, such an approach would cause serious
injury to the child, 148 the federal education laws could be invoked. While
observing that even if such laws were properly invoked, situations could arise
in which emotional needs were dominant (cases in which, the court implied,
the schools' responsibilities might differ), the court stated that no such determination was possible under the facts at hand since the child's emotional and
educational needs were significantly intertwined. 14 9 In such cases, the school
system could be held accountable for supplying a child with needed residential programming consistent with the EAHCA's free appropriate public education guarantee. 150
North thus represents an important first step toward the adoption of an
inclusionary approach to defining the scope of educational needs. The court
recognized that educational needs may overlap emotional needs in at least
some instances and that, notwithstanding this fact, such educational needs
must be addressed. The court's opinion, however, is flawed in certain
respects. As in other cases, the scope of the court's rationale and holding is
unclear. The court does not squarely state whether the child's emotional
needs themselves give rise to educational needs which must carefully be
attended, or whether emotional needs which indirectly affect a child's educational progress, as a result, attain derivative status as educational needs. The
court also preserved the dichotomy between educational and emotional
needs, and hinted that some sort of balancing process might be required to
determine whether a child's educational or noneducational need for a particular service predominates.1 5I This statement accordingly suggests that an
exclusionary approach might continue to be preferred, in future cases, at least
in instances in which strong noneducational needs are found to exist.
The second step in the development of the inclusionary approach came
two years later in Kruelle v. New Castle County School District.152 In Kruelle, the
Third Circuit addressed the obligation of the affected school system to provide a residential program for a 13-year-old profoundly mentally retarded boy
who also suffered from emotional problems. The school system had resisted
147. Id. at 140.
148. The court noted that a neglect proceeding would itself have had a significant adverse effect
on the child's course of treatment since his emotional problems would have been exacerbated by his
perception that he had been abandoned by his parents. Id.
149. Id. at 141.
150. Id. at 142.
151. Id. at 141.
152. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
553 F. Supp. 1107, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (following Kruelle approach).
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the parents' efforts to procure such programming, despite evidence of a successful prior residential placement and unsatisfactory local programming.
The Third Circuit affirmed a district court decision which held for the parents
after rejecting the view of a state hearing officer that the requested programming was more in the nature of parenting than education.15 3 While citing and
purporting to rely upon North, the court framed the issue in a somewhat more
helpful fashion by focusing directly upon whether residential placement "is
part and parcel of 'specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique

needs of a handicapped child' "-that is, whether that placement is "a necessary predicate for learning" rather than unrelated to learning skills. 154 The
Third Circuit went on to justify its ultimate affirmance of the district court's
decision by noting that residential programming was needed in order to provide the child in question with a greater degree of consistency in program55
ming available as a result of full time care.'
Kruelle demonstrates important progress in the development of the inclusionary approach to defining educational needs for at least two reasons. First,
the court squarely formulated the issue at bar in terms of the child's ability to
learn, recognizing that the fact that requested services might simultaneously
address emotional or custodial needs was largely irrelevant or at least of secondary importance. The decision therefore opened the way for abandonment
of the educational/emotional needs dichotomy preserved in North. Second,
the court articulated a more distinct rationale for its holding than had the
North decision. The court appeared to recognize that custodial and residential
support services could address a child's need for custodial care while simultaneously performing the critical educational function of reinforcing instruction
of basic life skills.
The streamlined analysis foreshadowed in Kruelle emerged at last in fullblown form in Abrahamson v. Hershman.156 Abrahamson involved another seriously impaired child-a 16-year-old boy diagnosed as severely mentally
retarded with behavior which was also described as autistic in character. Like
the child in North, the child in Abrahamson had been previously placed unsuccessfully in a residential program. When residential placement subsequently
became unavailable, the school system proposed that the child be placed in a
day program operated through a consortium of several local public school
systems; the school system did not include a residential component as part of
his IEP. The district court held that such residential programming was necessary since the child required an extremely structured environment if he was
not to regress from day to day, let alone have a chance to make any educational progress. 15 7 The appellate court cited the district court as stating, however, that needed residential services might be provided through placement in
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

642 F.2d 687.
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 694.
701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
Id. at 226.
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a group home in conjunction with the local day program. 5 8
The First Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that school systems have a paramount obligation to provide each handicapped child with a free appropriate
public education, one which must be afforded, in certain instances, in institutional settings which necessarily provide ancillary custodial care.' 59 The First
Circuit then observed that while foster care was not required to be provided,
services which appeared to be custodial might, in appropriate cases, constitute
a critical portion of a severely impaired child's educational program where
that program was intended to help him master basic life skills.' 60 The appellate court also upheld the district court's conclusion that such services may, at
the school district's option, be provided through placement in a group home
facility adequately equipped to meet the child's needs.' 6'
Abrahamson thus confirmed that the critical issue in determining whether a
child's needs are educational in character is whether they relate to his ability
to master pertinent skills. The court dismissed the defendant school district's
proposed dichotomy between educational and custodial needs as unwarranted, suggesting that such dichotomies will no longer be relevant to analysis
under the EAHCA.' 62 The court also provided an explicit rationale for its
determination that the custodial care in question was educational in nature,
emphasizing the fact that such custodial care and residential services themselves perform an educational function for a child who is endeavoring to
master basic self-care skills. Significantly, however, the court appeared to
question an alternative suggestion, noted above, that custodial needs deserve
derivative status as educational needs where, if left unattended, the child in
question would be denied a free appropriate public education. 16 3 Other deci158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.

162.

Id. at 228-29.

163. This inference may be drawn from a brief comment on the availability of residential programming for children who suffer from poor home situations.
This is not to say that the Act requires a local school committee to support a handicapped child
in a residential program simply to remedy a poor home setting or to make up for some other
deficit not covered by the Act. It is not the responsiblity of local officials under the Act to finance
foster care as such: other resources must be looked to. . . . Congress did not intend to burden
local school committees with providing all social services to all handicapped children.
Id. at 227-28. The court's statement might be seen to relieve schools of responsibility for providing
custodial services to children who are in fact receiving an appropriate education in the local setting
but who would also benefit from residential placement in order to escape difficulties at home. See,
e.g., In re Wellesley Pub. Schools, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:268 (Mass. SEA
1983); In re Joseph K., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:133 (Ga. SEA 1980). The
statement could also be interpreted in a broader fashion as limiting the responsibility of schools to
provide some type of residential programming even where the combined force of a child's handicap
and poor home setting precludes his receiving an appropriate education in the absence of such services. Federal regulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, referred to in the
commentary to the EAHCA regulations described supra note 134, are similarly ambiguous on this
point. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 app. A (1983) (regulation requiring that residential placements be
provided at no cost where necessary to provide a free appropriate education to a handicapped individual, interpreted in commentary as inapplicable "[wihen residential care is necessitated not by the
student's handicap, but by factors such as the student's home conditions").
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sionmakers have nevertheless adopted a contrary view, determining that residential placement should be afforded where necessary to address children's
educational needs, even in several cases in which those needs were exacer64
bated by poor home situations.1
Finally, the court resolved a question left unclear under the EAHCA regulations previously discussed, 165 by determining that custodial services provided in a group home, rather than an institution, were as necessary and
appropriate in addressing a child's educational needs as similar services available in a more restrictive institutional setting. 16 6 This result is likely to spur
increased reliance on community-based residential placement as an adjunct to
private day care programs, a result which may foster cost-effective delivery of
services in a beneficial, more fully integrated environment.
Abrahamson should not be interpreted as requiring school districts to routinely assume responsibilities for the complete range of handicapped children's instructional, custodial, emotional, and medical needs, however. The
scope of educational needs is only one of several questions which must be
answered in determining the mix of programming to be afforded a given
child. While an expansive, inclusionary view of educational needs lies at the
core of the Act's programming requirements, other aspects of the EAHCA
effectively limit the impact that might otherwise result from that interpretation. Thus, however broadly a child's needs may be defined, school districts
are only obliged to respond to those needs at the level and to the extent earlier described in parts II and III. Moreover, Congress has carved out a categorical medical services exception as part of its definition of "related
services," 16 7 thus intervening to relieve school districts of possible obligations
to address medical needs which indirectly affect a child's educational performance by restricting the types of services that might be used to do so.
The cases discussed above demonstrate, once again, that courts and quasijudicial decisionmakers faced with problems of construction under the
164. See Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 808 (1st Cir. 1982) (while governing consideration is not
the needs of the parents but of the child, child should not be placed in possibly hostile home environment which would adversely affect his educational development); In re Los Angeles Unified School
Dist., 1981-82 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:364 (Cal. SEA 1981) (where emotional
problems, home problems, and educational problems intertwined, residential placement would be
required); In re East Side Union High School Dist., 1981-82 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)
502:374 (Cal. SEA 1981) (although child's nonschool social environment is a major cause of her
school problems, residential placement required because all that matters is that her condition makes
her unable to learn); Case No. 81-14, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:292 (Conn.
SEA 1981) (residential placement required where student's academic progress had been minimal and
parent was unwilling or unable to cope with student's presence at home). This position seems well
founded for at least two reasons. First, the presence of a severely handicapped child can itself add
significant stress to the home environment. Efforts to distinguish between the effects of a child's
handicapping condition and the existence of independent problems in the home environment are,
therefore, often neither theoretically nor practically justified. Second, the whole thrust of EAHCA
appears to be to ensure that handicapped children receive an adequate education whatever the
nature or source of their handicap. Only an approach which takes the child as he is and addresses his
needs as they stand can accomplish this objective.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
166. Abrahamson, 701 F.2d at 229.
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
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EAHCA have turned to the concept of equal educational opportunity for guidance. Because this concept is an ambiguous one, competing lines of interpretation have developed. Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate such
competing views to determine which comports more closely with the policies
of the Act-in this case, an inclusionary approach to defining the scope of
educational needs which fall within its purview. At the same time, the question of scope cannot be viewed in isolation. Instead, the use of a broadly
defined notion of equal educational opportunity in this context is coupled
with distinct, more narrow applications of that concept in related contexts, to
describe the obligations of school districts to provide educational programming under the Act.
V
AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL SERVICES

Even assuming the adoption of a broad definition of educational needs for
purposes of the Act, an additional question frequently arises concerning the
availability of certain types of nontraditional services of a medical nature
needed to permit particular handicapped children to make even minimal progress toward appropriate goals and objectives. Parents have requested such
services in a variety of situations. For example, they have urged schools to
provide clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) to students paralyzed from
the waist down who need assistance in emptying their bladders during school
hours in order to avoid the risk of increased internal infections while enrolled
in regular classes appropriate to their intellectual needs.' 68 Parents have also
sought intensive psychotherapeutic services which can only be provided
through the supervision of a medically licensed psychiatrist.' 6 9 Schools hesitate to provide such services for a variety of reasons including concern
168. Clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) may be defined as follows:
CIC is a very simple procedure which can be performed within five minutes. The catheter is
washed with soap and water; the urethral area is wiped clean; the catheter is introduced approximately one and one-half inches into the urethra and the bladder contents drained; the catheter is
withdrawn; and the amount of urine collected is measured and noted. The procedure can be
taught to anyone after a training session of approximately thirty minutes, and it need not be
performed by a doctor or nurse. Currently, [plaintiffs child] is catheterized at home by her
parents, teenage sibling, and babysitter. However when [the child] is 8 or 9 years old, she will be
able to perform CIC upon herself.
Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 559 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) on remand, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981),
afd, 703 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1983), afd inpart, rev'd in part sub nom Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro,
104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984).
169. The term "psychotherapy" has generally been used to describe diverse forms of intensive
psychological intervention. See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 551 (Harre &
Lamb eds. 1983) (defining psychotherapy as "treatment of emotional and persorality difficulties by
psychological means"). Alternatively, the term has been seen to refer to treatment of "[a]ny form of
treatment for mental illnesses, behavioral maladaptations, and/or other problems that are assumed
to be of an emotional nature, in which a trained person deliberately establishes a professional relationship with a patient for the purpose of removing, modifying, or retarding existing symptoms or
attenuating or reversing disturbed patterns of behavior, and of promoting positive personality
growth and development." PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 519 (R. Campbell, 5th ed. 1981). Professionals
disagree concerning a more precise definition. See Psychotherapy as a "Related Service, " 1981-82 EDUC.
HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) ACI5, 16, 19, 23 (Supp. 60, Nov. 13, 1981).
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regarding anticipated high costs 17 0 and doubts concerning how provision of

medical services fit within their ever-expanding institutional mission. Many
schools have accordingly interpreted language in the Act as largely exempting
71
them from any obligation to provide such "medical" services.'
Disputes regarding the availability of medical services have not generally
been understood to involve uncertainty concerning the application of the concept of equal education opportunity. However, careful examination suggests
that, as in the two contexts previously considered, disagreements concerning
the interpretation to be accorded the EAHCA's medical services exception
rest, in part, on differing views concerning precisely that point.
Resolution of such disputes requires a determination of whether Congress
intended to remove all forms of nonevaluative, nondiagnostic medical services from its definition of related services available under the Act, 172 or
whether it desired to craft a medical services exception subject to two partial
limitations. Schools have urged that the medical services exception is a comprehensive one, designed to codify traditional practices. As noted above, nonhandicapped children have historically received an educational opportunity
embodied in a common or diversified curriculum of instructional services.
Through the Act, Congress required certain additional, related services to be
made available.1 7 3 With respect to medical services, however, Congress
expressly declined to vary from the norm. Accordingly, it is contended, the
EAHCA imposes no obligation to provide such services.
A competing argument might well be formulated in equal educational
opportunity terms. While the medical services exception may be broad, it is
limited in at least two respects, and it thus is better characterized as a partial
exception. First, nonhandicapped children should not be denied de minimus
medical services comparable to those provided to their nonhandicapped
peers. Second, where Congress has explicitly indicated that certain other
types of services (including psychological and counseling services) must be
made available in order to ensure that handicapped children receive an equal
opportunity to be educated in accordance with their unique needs, 174 the
medical services exception should be interpreted consistent with, rather than
in derogation of, that explicit requirement.
Section A reviews statutory and regulatory provisions bearing on the availability of medical services. Section B discusses the courts' interpretation of
the medical services proviso in two problematic factual contexts-when parents request that their child be provided with CIC, and when parents demand
that psychotherapy be provided at public expense. The analysis will conclude
that the Supreme Court's recent Tatro decision regarding the availability of
170. See McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404, 407 (D.D.C. 1983) (costs of outpatient psychiatric treatment approximately $23,000 per year, cost of inpatient treatment approximately $60,000
per year); see also Stark, supra note 11, at 516-18.
171. See infra text at note 175 for pertinent statutory text.
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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CIC and the decisions of the majority of lower courts concerning the provision of psychotherapy are consistent with the second of the two interpretations proposed above, that which recognizes two limitations on the EAHCA's
medical services exception in the interest of assuring a more broadly defined
equal educational opportunity.
A.

Statutory and Regulatory Text

The statutory text provides important, but cryptic, guidance. The definition of "related services" states that in "appropriate" cases the following services must be provided as part of a free appropriate public education:
[S]uch developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy,
recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for
diagnostic and evaluationpurposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit
from special education.175

This language is important both for what it gives and for what it takes away. It
expressly endorses the use of corrective and supportive services which are not
themselves educational in nature where required to ensure that a handicapped child's educational needs are met. At the same time the statute
expressly restricts the types of medical services to be provided.
This critical exception is framed in functional terms. By specifying that
medical services must be provided for diagnostic and evaluative purposes, the
statute implicitly suggests provision of such services for certain other purposes is not required. Obviously excluded are provision of services designed
to provide medical treatment to handicapped children, in an effort to reduce
the effect of their disabling conditions, and services to afford requisite life
support. Congress therefore appears to accomplish its probable objective of
ensuring that general responsibility for handicapped children's medical
requirements not be transferred from parents and other providers to the
schools. This interpretation simultaneously assumes that the reference to
diagnostic and evaluative purposes is not designed as Congress' own embodiment of a de minimis exception to a more comprehensive limitation on the
availability of medical services. Consequently, the possibility remains of interpreting this provision to require the provision of de minimis medical services
consistent with a narrow application of the concept of equal educational
opportunity such as described above.
The EAHCA's legislative history provides limited additional guidance concerning the appropriate interpretation of the medical services proviso. The
Senate bill, which served as the principal vehicle for discussion during the
early stages of the EAHCA's development, included a limited list of related
services and made no reference to the availability of medical services. 176 The
175. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982) (emphasis added).
176. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975) (" 'related services' means transportation and developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including, but not limited to,
speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, counseling services, physical and occupational therapy, and recreation) as required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special edu-

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

(Vol. 48: No. I

bill reported by the House Education and Labor Committee contained the
statute's current language, accompanied by a noncommital textual summary
of the revised definition. 177 The Conference Committee merely noted the
discrepancy between the House and Senate versions of the legislation while
acceding to the inclusion of the medical services proviso that was in the House
version. 178
The EAHCA regulations issued in the wake of enactment carefully defined
certain of the terms included in the statutory text. These rules included certain narrowly circumscribed "medical services" within the scope of available
"related services"-"services provided by a licensed physician to determine a
child's medically related handicapping condition which results in the child's
need for special education and related services."' 79 The regulations also
stated that "related services" include "school health services," defined as
"services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person."' 80
No commentary was provided to justify the latter provision, only a brief
observation that the related services definition included in the final regulations went beyond the formulation originally published in the proposed
text. 181

EAHCA regulations currently in force thus specify that two classes of medical services are to be provided, where necessary, pursuant to the EAHCA:
diagnostic and evaluative services, expressly addressed by the statute, and
school health services, an invention of the regulators. Unfortunately, no justification is included in support of the later school health services requirement.
One may infer from the first of the subsidiary definitions just quoted that the
regulators interpreted the term "medical services" to refer to services provided by a licensed doctor, but not services afforded by other licensed professionals or by laypersons. Accordingly, the services of nurses or other persons
referred to in the "school health services" definition would not be regarded as
"medical services" but instead required as another type of service authorized
by the more general catchall portion of the related services provision. This
conclusion is confirmed both by a subsequent interpretative ruling regarding
the availability of clean intermittent catherization 8 2 and by the approach
adopted in the ill-fated 1982 regulatory revisions addressing the general availcation, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children
and provision of services to such children").
177. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1975) (language of bill); id. at 27
("related services" include "recreation, and medical and counseling services").
178. See S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975).
179. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4) (1984).
180. Id. § 300.13(b)(10).
181. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,505 (1977).
182. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4912 (198 1) (interpretative ruling regarding the availability of CIC); id. at
25,614 (indefinitely postponing implementation of interpretive ruling). The interpretative ruling
concluded that CIC should be provided, consistent with prevailing judicial precedent, because: CIC
could be performed by unlicensed persons with minimal training; such services could be covered by
the reference to "supportive services" which appeared elsewhere in the related services definition;
and such services permitted children to be placed in the least restrictive environment rather than
consigned to home study.
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ability of medical services under the Act.' 8 3 The merits of this approach are
explored more readily after a brief exposition of relevant case law.
B.

Judicial Response

A substantial body of case law is beginning to develop concerning the
scope of the EAHCA's related services provision and the medical services proviso. t 84 Discussion of the evolving doctrine is advanced best by concentrating
upon the two fact patterns receiving the most sustained judicial attentionchallenges involving the availability of clean intermittent catheterization
needed by children with spina bifida and disputes concerning the provision of
psychotherapy.
1. Clean Intermittent Catheterization. The ongoing litigation in the Tatro case
provides an obvious focal point for examination of the availability of CIC, for
it is this case which the Supreme Court recently chose as its own vehicle for
exploring the scope of the EAHCA's medical services proviso.' 8 5 Amber
Tatro's story, like Amy Rowley's, is now well known. Amber was born with
spina bifida and, as a result of that birth defect, suffered from orthopedic and
speech impediments and a neurogenic bladder.' 86 When Amber was 3 years
183. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (1982) (proposed amendments to EAHCA regulations). The proposed regulations would have deleted the school health services portion of the earlier related services definition because no reference to such services was included in the statutory definition. Id. at
33,838. Any other obligation any agency might have to handicapped children in making available the
same services provided to nonhandicapped children would have been unaffected by this change,
however. Id. at 33,854 (proposed 34 C.F.R. § 300.13). See also id. at 33,839. Moreover, the regulatory preamble specifically stated that these changes were not designed to "categorically preclude the
provision of [CIC]"; instead decisions on whether that service was required would be made by public
agencies on an individualized basis. Id. at 33,838.
The proposed regulations would also have modified the existing medical services definition in
several other pertinent ways. First, the reference to licensed physicians previously included in the
regulatory "medical services" definition was replaced with a broader reference to "services relating
to the practice of medicine." Id. at 38,846 (proposed 34 C.F.R. § 300.4(10)(i)). Second, the regulations stated that public agencies were not required to provide life sustaining procedures that: (1)
could be provided outside the normal school day, (2) must be performed under sterile conditions, (3)
must be administered by specially trained, licensed health care professionals, or (4) entailed a significant risk of illness or more than minimal injury to the child. Id. Neither were schools required to
provide surgical procedures, medication or the administration of medication, or individually prescribed devices such as eyeglasses. Id.
The proposed regulations were later withdrawn in large part. See EHLR Round-Up: Houe Hearings
on Proposed Regulations, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) SA-I 1 (Supp. 81, Oct. 1, 1982).
184. See, e.g., Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1983) (maintenance of tracheotomy tube is related service); Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Tex.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 708 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983) (air conditioning is related service).
185. The Tatro litigation endured for more than four years. See 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex.
1979), vacated and remanded, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), on remand, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex.
1981), affd, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Irving Indep. School Dist.
v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984). The Tatro litigation is discussed in Note, A Confusion of Rights and
Remedies: Tatro v. Texas, 14 CONN. L. REV. 585 (1982). For other cases involving CIC, see Tokarcik
v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.
W. Va. 1976) (decided under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); cf Department of Educ.
v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983) (availability of emergency services required by child
with cerebral palsy whose tracheotomy tube might be dislodged).
186. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3374 (1984).
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old, her parents requested that she be permitted to attend the Irving
Independent School District's early childhood development program. The
school district did not refuse her admission but declined to provide CIC
needed by Amber if she was to be present throughout the half-day program.
The Tatros brought an action for injunctive relief in federal district court
under the EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.187
The court rebuffed the Tatros when it granted defendants' motion to dismiss the EAHCA claim. 188 The district court reasoned that the related services required under the Act were of two types: (1) transportation and (2)
supportive services required to assist the child to benefit from special education.' 8 9 Because the latter category "might, if read literally, require schools to
furnish every necessary life support system," the court adopted a narrowing
gloss by stating that "to be related in the statutory sense, the service requirement must arise from the effort to educate."'' 90 The court also concluded that
only those "school health services" which satisfied this restrictive interpretation of "related services" could be required.' 9 ' The court did not, however,
attempt to probe, in any detail, the significance of the medical services exclu92

sion itself.1

The Fifth Circuit rejected this restrictive reading.19 3 The appellate court
concluded that CIC was a supportive service for purposes of the related services definition. 194 However, the panel believed that the Act contained its own
limitations which would ensure that school systems could not be required to
supply every extensive life support procedure a child might need. 9 5 The
court also stressed the importance of the Act's least restrictive environment
mandate, 196 stating that a determination concerning the availability of CIC
should take into account the fact that a child denied such services would likely
be consigned to educationally inappropriate programs of homebound instruc187. Id. at 3374-75.
188. A claim was also asserted under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The lower
court rejected that claim using reasoning similar to that with which it disposed of the EAHCA cause
of action. 481 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (N.D. Tex. 1981). The Court of Appeals reversed on this point as
well, concluding that CIC was the sort of minimal reasonable accomodation required by that statute.
625 F.2d 557, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1980). Six members of the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that
the Tatros were not entitled to relief under section 504, and attendant attorneys' fees, since "relief
[was] available under the Education of the Handicapped Act to remedy a denial of educational services." 104 S. Ct. at 3379. See also Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984) (holding that parents
are not entitled to receive attorneys' fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act where a remedy is
available under the EAHCA but no provision is made under that statute for award of attorneys' fees).
189. 481 F. Supp. at 1227.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1228.
192. Id.
193. 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
194. Id. at 562.
195. Id. at 562-63. The court cited three such limitations: (1) the requirement that the affected
child be handicapped and require special education; (2) the necessity that the life support system aid
the child in benefiting from special education, which the court believed limited the required services
to those needed during school hours; and (3) the rule that the life support system be one which a
nurse or other qualified person could provide.
196. Id. at 563.
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tion.19 7 The case was then vacated and remanded for necessary additional
proceedings.
In Tatro II, the district court proceeded to inquire whether, under Texas
law, CIC was a medical service which could only be provided by a physician or
whether it fell within the scope of the regulatory provision relating to "school
health services" capable of provision by a qualified school nurse or other
qualified person. 9 8 With the aid of briefs from state and local medical
associations, the court concluded that a qualified individual acting pursuant to
a physician's prescription and under a physician's supervision could provide
CIC. 9 The school district appealed and a different panel of the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.2 0 0 While expressing reservations about the merits of the earlier
panel's decision, the court nevertheless concluded that the analysis included
in Tatro I represented a reasonable reading of a "delphic statute." 20 ' The
second panel also upheld the trial court's reading of Texas law concerning the
proper practice of medicine, as well as the application of that law to the facts
20 2
at hand.
A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed on EAHCA grounls.2 0 3 The Court
held that CIC is a supportive service which was needed by Amber Tatro to
allow her to benefit from special education.2 0 4 It further determined that the
medical services exception did not apply.2 0 5 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied heavily upon an earlier interpretative ruling of CIC which had
been issued by the United States Department of Education,2 0 6 a ruling which
the Court believed was entitled to deference as a reasonable interpretation of
congressional intent.2 0 7 The Court stated that the Secretary of Education
"could reasonably have concluded that [the medical services exception] was
designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a service that might
208
well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence."
The Court then explained that the provision of CIC imposed no such cost
burden, and that the obligation of schools to make CIC and other school
health services available merely required districts to continue to provide limited school nursing services simlar to those traditionally afforded all chil197. Id.
198. 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
199. Id. at 975-77.
200. 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983).
201. Id. at 826.
202. Id. at 827-29. The court also rejected arguments that Amber did not, in fact, require CIC
in order to attend the district's half-day early childhood program, and that intervening interpretations required a reversal of its earlier determination concerning the merits of plaintiff's claim under
section 504 thereby relieving the school district of liability for attorneys' fees under that provision.
Id. at 831-32.
203. 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented from the
majority's determination that the Tatros could not be awarded attorneys' fees. Id. at 3379-80.
204. Id. at 3377.
205. Id.
206. See supra note 182.
207. 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3377 (1984).
208. Id. at 3378.
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dren. 20 9 The Court rejected the school district's argument that CIC should be
regarded as a medical service since it could only be provided pursuant to a
physician's prescription under Texas law. Instead, the Court noted that
minor medical services, such as the administration of medicine, were routinely
provided to nonhandicapped children, concluding that "[i]t would be strange
indeed if Congress, in attempting to extend special services to handicapped
children, were unwilling to guarantee them services of a kind that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped." 21 0 Finally, the Court cited four
restrictions which it believed moderated the burdens upon school districts
that might flow from the application of its de minimus limitation on the medical services exception: (1) related services such as CIC need only be provided to handicapped children in need of special education; (2) only services
necessary to aid a child to benefit from such education need be supplied, not
services that might be provided outside the school day; (3) only services that
may be performed by a nurse or a layperson must be provided, not those
which require the assistance of a physician; and (4) only de minimis medical
21
services, not equipment, must be made available. '
The Court's decision in Tatro is a sound, well-reasoned one. The case's
outcome reflected the balance of equities involved. Amber Tatro's situation
was much more emotionally compelling than Amy Rowley's. A determination
that CIC is a related service was required if Amber was to receive an education
at all appropriate to her social and intellectual abilities, rather than being consigned to the plainly inadequate alternatives of home study or placement in a
private setting catering to children with much more severe multiple impairments. Few countervailing considerations favored the school district. Provision of CIC was neither disruptive nor costly, especially when compared to
the expensive placement alternatives just described. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that the Court would conclude that the Tatros should prevail.
The decision is also carefully grounded and explained. The Court made
no bones about its reliance upon equal educational opportunity principles as
a central basis for its decision. It disposed of the school district's proposed
interpretation of the medical services exception in a single paragraph,
stressing repeatedly that only a "strange" or "anomolous" reading would
attribute to Congress a desire to deny handicapped children access to services
available to their nonhandicapped peers. 2 12 The Court might have gone even
further in bolstering its justification, for the EAHCA's legislative history
2 3
plainly supports this position. i
209.
210.

Id.
Id.

211.

Id. at 3379.

212. Id. at 3377-78.
213. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975) ("The Committee points out in
addition that a handicapped child has a right to receive all services normally provided a nonhandicapped child enrolled in a public elementary .. .school. Thus, he or she has a right to physical
education services, health screening, transportation services and all other services which are provided
to all children within the school system, and a right to as many options in curricula as are available to
all children.") (emphasis added).
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This approach provides an important theoretical underpinning absent
from existing regulations and prior case law. The Education Department's
"school health services" regulations 21 4 no longer appear rooted in an arbitrary distinction between two classes of medically trained and licensed personnel (doctors and nurses), each of whom would appear to provide medical
services, that is, services designed to maintain health and prevent, alleviate, or
cure disease. Instead, the requirement that certain services be provided
through school nurses is explained in terms of historical tradition and the
probable intention of Congress to preserve that tradition for all children. The
Fifth Circuit's earlier determination that "school health services" include only
those medical services that must unavoidably be provided during the school
day21 5 is similarly illuminated. No comparable restriction has been applied to
other types of related services, such as counseling, which might well be provided outside of traditional school hours; it is therefore evident that this limiting gloss does not stem from the terms of the "related service" definition
which specify that such services must be "required to assist" a handicapped
child to benefit from special education. The Court's approach makes plain
that the limitation flows inevitably from the fundamental premise that handicapped children should receive school health services comparable to those
enjoyed by others. Since nonhandicapped children only receive school medical services that cannot be provided in off hours, that same restriction should
apply to their handicapped peers.
In addition to providing a useful theoretical perspective, the Court offered
needed practical guidance. Two questions are likely to emerge in the wake of
the Tatro decision: (1) what are the obligations of school districts which do
not now employ school nurses? and (2) what range of school health services
other than CIC need be supplied? Tatro touches on each of these questions in
at least a preliminary fashion.
It is plain that school districts which provide school health services must
open those services to both handicapped and nonhandicapped children.
Irving Independent School District apparently authorized school nurses to
dispense oral medications and administer emergency injections in accordance
with a physician's prescription. 21 6 It is therefore obliged to accommodate the
needs of handicapped students for simlar, minimal medical assistance. Given
these facts, the Court's holding might be viewed as a narrow one, applicable
only to schools currently providing school health services through school
nurses. The Court's logic would seem, however, to dictate a broader result.
The Court did not rest its decision solely on Irving Independent School District's past practices. Instead, it relied upon federal regulations which had
reasonably concluded that Congress had designed the medical services exception to limit school district obligations to provide costly hospital and physician
services, not to supplant the traditional system of retaining school nurses on
214.
215.

See supra note 182.
See supra note 195.

216.

104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 (1984).
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school district staffs. Read in this restrictive fashion, the medical services proviso does not limit the authority of federal regulators to require all school
districts to supply CIC and other supportive school health services, whether
those districts have done so in the past or not. The Court thus ensured that a
nationwide standard would continue to govern the minimum range of services
available under the EAHCA, rather than limiting its equal educational opportunity equation to analysis of the historical practices of individual school districts. Whether districts will meet their obligations by hiring school nurses,
contracting for visiting nurse assistance, or training other personnel to meet
necessary requirements will be up to them.
The range of de minimis school health services that must be provided in
the wake of Tatro is less clear. Tatro recognizes that at least those services that
may only be provided by licensed physicians generally fall within the medical
services exception and need not be supplied under the EAHCA. Thus, it is
clear that schools need not pay the cost of corrective surgery or other similar
procedures. At the same time, Tatro indicates that certain de minimis medical
services that can be performed by registered nurses or other qualified personnel must be provided. Schools will be obliged to expand their current
medical service offerings, increasing both the types of medical services available (providing CIC as well as dispensing medication), and the terms on
which those services are offered (supplying routine as well as emergency
assistance). It is obvious that state licensing laws and attendant restrictions on
nurses' authority and duties will serve as an outer limit on schools' obligations
under the Court's ruling, 21 7 and that, in any event, federal regulators are
likely to defer to such authority. 218 School districts' responsibilities may well
fall somewhat short of offering a full range of services that a nurse is capable
of providing, however. As previously discussed,2 19 the rationale of the Tatro
decision was not simply that licensed doctors, and not nurses, are providers of
medical services. Instead, the decision recognized that a certain class of
nursing services traditionally had been offered nonhandicapped children, and
that a comparable set of de minimis services should thus be available to handicapped children under the EAHCA. It therefore follows that only certain
nursing services need be provided by local educational agencies. Which services fall within this de minimis class will likely stir continuing debate. The
Court's analysis in Tatro suggests, however, that only those medical services
which can safely be performed in the school environment, with minimal time,
staff, expense, and equipment, should be seen to fall within the Tatro rule.
Other services, such as the performance of kidney dialysis, cannot fairly be
characterized as de minimis in character. Accordingly, they should be
217. Id. at 3379. ("school nursing services must be provided only if they can be performed by a
nurse or other qualified person").
218. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 33,839 (1982) (guideline accompanying proposed regulatory amendment specified that public agencies may look to standards, opinions, and other determinations of
State medical licensing authorities in determining if certain services are medical services within the
meaning of the EAHCA).
219. See supra text accompanying note 214.
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regarded as falling within the statutory medical services exception, even if
they might be provided by a nurse or other trained person acting under a
physician's direction.
In sum, the Supreme Court's approach in Tatro both parallels and differs
from its approach in Rowley. The equal educational opportunity theme underlies both decisions. Although Rowley had defined the level and extent of services under the Act in terms of a restrained "some benefit" version of that
theme, Tatro reflects a more expansive interpretation, appropriate to its subtly
different subject matter. While considerations ofjusticiability and cost limited
the Court's choice of standard in the earlier case, similar constraints did not
prevent its adoption in Tatro of a construction which required minimal expenditure of school district funds and which necessitated only limited, nationwide
comparison of the types of services afforded handicapped and nonhandicapped children.
2. Psychotherapy. While many schools have agreed to provide CIC in
response to pressure from federal administrative agencies and unanimous
court decisions, schools have more slowly and reluctantly conceded a possible
obligation to provide intensive psychotherapy when needed by children who
are seriously emotionally or mentally impaired. Although psychotherapeutic
services at times are offered by trained social workers and psychologists, they
may also be offered by psychiatrists who are licensed physicians, or by social
workers and psychologists operating under a physician's direction. At least
arguably, those intensive services offered by or under the supervision of a
psychiatrist may be characterized as medical in character. In the wake of
Tatro, a dearth of definitive regulatory guidance concerning the availability of
such services and an emerging split in judicial opinions on this issue is likely
to result in growing uncertainty regarding the schools' obligations to provide
such services at no cost.
Consistent with the EAHCA's statutory text, 2 20 United States Department
of Education regulations specify that certain counseling and psychological
services must be provided. The regulations define counseling services by reference to possible service providers, stating that such services are those "provided by qualified social workers, psychologists, guidance counselors, or other
qualified personnel." 22 1 "Psychological services," in turn, refers to the performance of several specific diagnostic, interpretive, and counseling functions. 2 22

Because the regulations do not expressly include psychiatrists

among the listed providers of counseling services, they may imply that schools
are not obliged to supply psychotherapeutic services only available from such
persons or services provided under their direction. The Department of Edu-

220.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).

221.

See 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(2) (1984).
Id. at § 300.13(b)(8):

222.
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cation's more recent pronouncements have been equivocal on this point. 223
The weight ofjudicial authority interprets the EAHCA to require the provision of psychotherapy in appropriate cases. In re "A " Family is an early representative case which adopts this view. 2 24 The case involved a family of a
seriously emotionally disturbed, schizophrenic boy which requested the provision of intensive psychiatric services for the boy as part of a private residential
program. The plaintiffs asked the Montana Supreme Court to determine
whether such services were medical services, which fell beyond the scope of
the definition of related services just discussed, or psychological services,
which are listed without qualification as an available service within the terms
of the EAHCA. After consulting a standard dictionary, the court concluded
that "psychotherapy" referred to "treatment of [a] mental or emotional disorder or of related bodily ills by psychological means."

2 25

Since the court

believed such psychotherapeutic services were expressly included within the
phrase "psychological services," the court gave no further consideration to
2 26
the application of the medical services proviso.
A recent decision of the federal district court for the Northern District of
Illinois took an opposing position. Darlene L. v. Illinois State Board of Education 22 7 involved a child diagnosed as having a severe behavioral disorder.
Local school officials and the child's parents argued that she needed placement in a residential program. However, the state administrative agency
charged with review of private placements refused to authorize payment for
"Psychological services" include:
(i) Administering psychological and educational tests, and other assessment procedures;
(ii) Interpreting assessment results;
(iii) Obtaining, integrating, and interpreting information about child behavior and conditions relating to learning;
(iv) Consulting with other staff members in planning school programs to meet the special
needs of children as indicated by psychological tests, interviews, and behavioral evaluation; and
(v) Planning and managing a program of psychological services, including psychological
counseling for children and parents.
223. The Office of Special Education has taken a somewhat equivocal position on the issue. See
2 [EHA Rulings] EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 211:19 (1978) (if state interprets psychotherapy

as "medical service," local education agency is not obligated to provide such service since 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.13 requires medical services for diagnostic and evaluative purposes only; if state interprets
psychotherapy as "counseling services," services must be provided at no cost to parents if they are
listed in IEP as related services); id. at 211:104-:105 (1979) (where state law permits "psychotherapy"
to be provided by someone other than a psychiatrist and psychotherapy is needed to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, psychotherapy might be considered a "related service" under Department "related service" regulations). The Office of Civil Rights, during the same
period, opined that psychiatric services must be provided, where appropriate, pursuant to section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 3 [§ 504 Rulings] EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 257:82

(1980); id. at 257:57, :191, :248 (1980).
224. 602 P.2d 157 (Mont. 1979). See also Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn.
1981); T.G. v. Board of Educ., 576 F. Supp. 420 (D.NJ. 1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1984);
Max M. v. Thompson, 1984-85 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 556:227 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (psychotherapy provided by psychiatrist is related service, but services provided by social worker or other
qualified non-physician provider are generally reimbursable costs).
225. 602 P.2d at 165.
226. Id.
227. 568 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See also McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404, 412
(D.D.C. 1983).
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psychiatric services provided in conjunction with the proposed placement
because he concluded that such services were medical in character. The district court agreed with this interpretation. The court rejected the view that
the services in question were psychological services for purposes of the
EAHCA. 2 28 In support of its position, the court cited the EAHCA regulations' definition of psychological services which does not list psychiatrists
among the possible providers of such services. 2 29 The court contended that
psychiatrists are, by definition, licensed physicians. 230 Therefore, intensive
psychotherapy afforded by such providers should be deemed medical services.
Since the psychotherapeutic services sought for Darlene L. were other than
diagnostic or evaluative in purpose, the school system had no obligation to
23
provide those services at public expense pursuant to the EAHCA. '
Resolution of this conflict in authority requires a three-part analysis. First,
are psychotherapeutic services provided by or under the supervision of a psychiatrist "psychological services" for purposes of the Act? The statute provides no direct guidance on this question, but seems indirectly to suggest that
the answer should be "yes." The "related services" definition refers to both
"counseling" and "psychological services," 2 32 evidencing what appears to be
an intent to encompass a broad spectrum of mental health services. Had Congress wished to exclude the most intensive types of mental health services
from this range, it could have done so explicitly, as it did in excluding certain
forms of medical services from the spectrum of related services available.
Moreover, coverage of such intensive mental health services arises by implication as a result of the express coverage and protection of seriously emotionally disturbed children under the Act. 2 33 It is questionable whether Congress

would have included such children as beneficiaries of the legislation while at
the same time limiting their access to the intensive services possibly needed
for attaining any meaningful educational progress.
Second, are psychotherapeutic services provided by or under the supervision of a psychiatrist "medical services" within the terms of the statute? To
the extent that intensive psychotherapeutic services can only be provided by a
licensed psychiatrist or under a psychiatrist's supervision, the answer would
seen to be "yes," in light of the Tatro decision discussed above. This class of
services might include the prescription of drugs. In other cases, the answer
should be "no." Counseling services available from social workers or psychologists who need not possess or be supervised by a person possessing a
medical license are not generally regarded as medical in nature. Indeed, Congress specifically contemplated that the services of such persons would be
228.

568 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Il1. 1983).

229.

Id.

230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id. at 1345.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
See supra note 25.
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available under the EAHCA. 2 34 The fact that a medically trained and licensed
psychiatrist can also provide similar counseling services should not transform
those services so as to render them "medical" in character when performed
by nonmedical personnel. 23 5 Instead, it suggests that psychiatrists performing certain counseling functions may themselves be providing services
reasonably regarded as nonmedical in character, at least for purposes of the
Act. It follows, in turn, that social workers or psychologists who work under
the supervision of a psychiatrist are not necessarily supplying medical services, but may instead be functioning as adjunct providers of counseling services solely for purposes of convenience and cost control, rather than because
oversight by a medically licensed psychiatrist is legally required with respect
to all their activities. In a substantial number of cases, therefore, the provision of psychotherapeutic counseling services should not be regarded as medical in character and should therefore fall outside the medical services
exception.
The final question, in any event, is whether the medical services proviso
should be interpreted in isolation. If intensive psychotherapeutic services

(including those services uniquely available from or under the supervision of a
licensed psychiatrist) fall within the phrase "psychological services" but are
excluded under the medical services proviso, it is necessary to determine how
these two provisions are to be reconciled. Standard canons of statutory construction suggest that the more general reference to medical services should
not lightly be adjudged to override the more specific treatment of psychological services. 23 6 Moreover, a basic rule of construction assumes that each of
several listed items should be afforded independent significance. 2 3 7 This
would only be the case if the "psychological services" provision is seen to
stand on its own rather than narrowed consistent with the medical services
proviso. Although the matter is plainly not free from doubt, 2 38 the better

reading
services
treated,
analysis

of the EAHCA is that the full range of intensive psychotherapeutic
should not be regarded as medical services but should instead be
in appropriate cases, as psychological services requiring no special
beyond that discussed in Parts II through IV above. 2 39 In effect, the

234. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975); Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro,
104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 (1984).
235. See T.G. v. Board of Educ., 576 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D.N.J. 1983).
236. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
237. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (canons of construction suggest that
terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meaning unless context dictates otherwise); De
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (word "or" is often used as a careless substitute for the
word "and").
238. See Psychotherapy as a "Related Service, " supra note 169.
239. To say that psychiatric services can in some instances be a related service for purposes of
the Act is not, however, to conclude that psychiatric services are required by every handicapped child
in every case. Under the Rowley decision discussed in part III supra, school districts would be obligated to provide such services only in those cases in which less intensive psychological services were
insufficient to permit a child to benefit and make some progress toward appropriate educational
goals. Thus, psychiatric services which go well beyond what is required for educational purposes do
not fall within the scope of a school district's responsibilities under the EAHCA.
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medical services proviso should be seen as a partial, rather than comprehensive, exception to the EAHCA's related services definition, in order to honor
Congress intent that children with severe emotional impairments have access
to a full range of services needed to provide an equal educational opportunity.
In sum, the concept of equal educational opportunity can once again be
employed as an aid to construing ambiguous provisions of the EAHCA. As
demonstrated, notwithstanding Congress' explicit limitation on the availability of medical services, a de minimis limitation on that exception has been
described by reference to the concept of equal educational opportunity. The
concept also serves as a useful reminder that the medical services exception
should be interpreted in the context of Congress' overall plan to ensure that
all children, including seriously emotionally disturbed children in need of the
full range of psychotherapeutic services, should receive those services needed
to allow them to make at least minimal educational progress.
VI
CONCLUSION

This article has traced the major theme of equal educational opportunity
as it bears upon educational programming decisions under the EAHCA. It
has been argued that this complex theme is subject to numerous competing
interpretations which must be carefully explored in each of the several settings in which the theme recurs. It has been suggested that the courts have
relied upon the concept as an interpretive aid in addressing three important
questions under the Act: in describing the level and extent of services to be
provided handicapped children, in defining the scope of their educational
needs, and in delineating the types of medical services available. Finally, the
article has evaluated competing interpretations adopted in the judicial decisions which address these questions and has proposed alternative interpretations, where necessary, to give fuller effect to Congress' paramount
objective-assisting state and local governments to meet the educational
needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law.

